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Articles
California's Anti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven Years
Jerome I. Braun*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been eleven years since California enacted its anti-SLAPP remedy,
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,' allowing defendants an accelerated
motion to strike a cause of action if it arose "from any act ... in furtherance of
the ... right of petition or free speech.., in connection with a public issue....
Eleven years is long enough for a statutory innovation to mature. How has this no
longer new remedy developed since its passage, and what uncertainties still
remain?
The elements of a SLAPP suit are: "1. a civil complaint or counterclaim (for
monetary damages and/or injunction), 2. filed against.., individuals and/or
groups, 3. because of their communications to a government body, official, or the
electorate, 4. on an issue of some public interest or concern. 3 A SLAPP
plaintiff's purpose is not to win its claims, because its action is typically barred
by constitutional or other privilege, but to intimidate the defendants into ceasing
their opposition to what the plaintiffs want to do, and to divert the defendants'
resources and energies into defending themselves against an action by a party
typically much better able to bear the cost and strain of litigation.4
* Jerome I. Braun, a founding partner in the San Francisco law firm of Farella Braun + Martel LLP, is a
Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers, a Member of the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers,
and Past President of the California College of Appellate Lawyers. He is pleased to acknowledge the assistance
of David F. Phillips, also of Farella Braun + Martel, in preparing this article for publication.
1. See Act of Sept. 16, 1992, ch. 726, sec. 425.16, § 2, 1992 Cal. Stat. 3522, 3523-24. Chapter 338 of the
Statutes of 2003 added a new Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 to the anti-SLAPP law.
2. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2003). All statutory references are to California
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 unless otherwise indicated. SLAPP is an acronym for "Strategic
Lawsuit Against Public Participation"-the term was invented by George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, the
pre-eminent scholars in the field, in their groundbreaking 1988 article, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation, 35 SOC. PROBS. 506 (1988); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.
4th 1106, 1109 n.1, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 472 n.1 (1999); Governor Gray Davis Comm. v. Am. Taxpayers
Alliance, 102 Cal. App. 4th 449, 454 n.I, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 538 n.1 (2002). The constitutional protections
for speech and petitioning are of course derived from the First Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. I:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
3. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
3, 8 (1989). The omitted word is "nongovemmental"-under California law SLAPPs can be filed against
governmental entities and individuals. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Irvine City Council, 97 Cal. App. 4th 174, 118
Cal. Rptr. 2d 330 (2002).
4. SLAPP suits are brought to obtain an economic advantage over the defendant, not to vindicate a
legally cognizable right of the plaintiff. Indeed, one of the common characteristics of a SLAPP suit is
its lack of merit. But lack of merit is not of concern to the plaintiff because the plaintiff does not
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This burden on the exercise of constitutional rights had long required a
procedure for the "fast and inexpensive unmasking and dismissal of SLAPP's."5
That is what the California anti-SLAPP statute was intended to do. At the time it
was enacted it was the most ambitious and far-reaching of all the state anti-
SLAPP laws. Broadly speaking, it allows a defendant to move to strike a
complaint or cause of action arising from protected speech or petitioning activity,
without the need for further proceedings unless the plaintiff can show a
reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits of the action.6 "[T]he statute
sets forth a remedy for those whose First Amendment rights have been
suppressed by the pernicious use of the judicial process. '7 The policy, passage
and early interpretation of this statute have been treated in detail in an earlier
article.' This article will focus on how the remedy has matured after more than a
decade of experience by courts, litigants, and the Legislature.9
expect to succeed in the lawsuit, only to tie up the defendant's resources for a sufficient length of time
to accomplish plaintiff's underlying objective. As long as the defendant is forced to devote its time,
energy and financial resources to combating the lawsuit its ability to combat the plaintiff in the
political arena is substantially diminished.
Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 816, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450 (1994) (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
5. Id. at 823, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454; see also Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1068,
1073-74, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 401 (2001) ("quick and inexpensive method"). Lam v. Ngo, 91 Cal. App. 4th
832, 841, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 589 (2001) (emphasis in original):
"the whole purpose of the [anti-SLAPPI statute is to provide a mechanism for the early
termination of claims that are improperly aimed at the exercise of free speech or the right of
petition. (See Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, [85 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1364, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864,
869 (2001)] ['the anti-SLAPP legislation found in section 425.16 provides an efficient means of
dispatching, early on in a lawsuit, a plaintiffs meritless claims']."
6. "For purposes of this section, 'complaint' includes 'cross-complaint' and 'petition,' 'plaintiff'
includes 'cross-complainant' and 'petitioner,' and 'defendant' includes 'cross-defendant' and 'respondent."'
§ 425.16(h). In the literature the terms "filer" and "target" are sometimes used instead. See, e.g., GEORGE W.
PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, GErITNG SUED FOR SPEAKING OuT 9-10 (1996).
7. City of Cotati v. Cashman, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407, 412 (2001), afftd, 29 Cal. 4th 69, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d
519 (2002).
8. See Jerome 1. Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in California,
32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 967-73 (1999).
9. For convenient reference the text of the statute is reprinted here.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16. Actions arising from exercise of free speech or right of
petition; legislative findings; motion to strike; stay of discovery; fees, costs; exception;
report to legislature
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits
brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of
speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that
it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public
significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial
process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.
(b)(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of
the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to
strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.
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(2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is
based.
(3) If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he or
she will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination
shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, and no burden of proof or
degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determination.
(c) In any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a special motion to
strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs. If the court finds
that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing
on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5.
(d) This section shall not apply to any enforcement action brought in the name of the people
of the State of California by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney,
acting as a public prosecutor.
(e) As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech
under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue"
includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive,
or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written
or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to
the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any
other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.
(f) The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the
court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper. The motion shall be
noticed for hearing not more than 30 days after service unless the docket conditions of
the court require a later hearing.
(g) All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon the filing of a notice of
motion made pursuant to this section. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until
notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion. The court, on noticed motion and for
good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this
subdivision.
(h) For purposes of this section, "complaint" includes "cross-complaint" and "petition," "plaintiff'
includes "cross-complainant" and "petitioner," and "defendant" includes "cross-defendant" and
"respondent."
(i) On or before January 1, 1998, the Judicial Council shall report to the Legislature on the
frequency and outcome of special motions made pursuant to this section, and on any
other matters pertinent to the purposes of this section.
(J) An order granting or denying a special motion to strike shall be appealable under Section
904.1.
(k)(I)Any party who files a special motion to strike pursuant to this section, and any party who
files an opposition to a special motion to strike, shall, promptly upon so filing, transmit to
the Judicial Council, by e-mail or fax, a copy of the endorsed-filed caption page of the
motion or opposition, a copy of any related notice of appeal or petition for a writ, and a
conformed copy of any order issued pursuant to this section, including any order granting
or denying a special motion to strike, discovery, or fees.
(2) The Judicial Council shall maintain a public record of information transmitted
pursuant to this subdivision for at least three years, and may store the information on
microfilm or other appropriate electronic media.
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CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17 (effective Jan. 1, 2004):
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing abuse of Section
425.16, the California Anti-SLAPP Law, which has undermined the exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances,
contrary to the purpose and intent of Section 425.16. The Legislature finds and declares
that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public
significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial
process or Section 425.16.
(b) Section 425.16 does not apply to any action brought solely in the public interest or on
behalf of the general public if all of the following conditions exist:
(1) The plaintiff does not seek any relief greater than or different from the
relief sought for the general public or a class of which the plaintiff is a member. A
claim for attorney's fees, costs, or penalties does not constitute greater or different
relief for purposes of this subdivision.
(2) The action, if successful, would enforce an important right affecting the
public interest, and would confer a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or
nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large class of persons.
(3) Private enforcement is necessary and places a disproportionate financial
burden on the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiffs stake in the matter.
(c) Section 425.16 does not apply to any cause of action brought against a person primarily
engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, including, but not limited
to, insurance, securities, or financial instruments, arising from any statement or conduct
by that person if both of the following conditions exist:
(1) The statement or conduct consists of representations of fact about that
person's or a business competitor's business operations, goods, or services, that is
made for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing sales or
leases of, or commercial transactions in, the person's goods or services, or the
statement or conduct was made in the course of delivering the person's goods or
services.
(2) The intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer, or a
person likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual or
potential buyer or customer, or the statement or conduct arose out of or within the
context of a regulatory approval process, proceeding, or investigation, except where
the statement or conduct was made by a telephone corporation in the course of a
proceeding before the California Public Utilities Commission and is the subject of a
lawsuit brought by a competitor, notwithstanding that the conduct or statement
concerns an important public issue.
(d) Subdivisions (b) and (c) do not apply to any of the following:
(1) Any person enumerated in subdivision (b) of Section 2 of Article I of the
California Constitution or Section 1070 of the Evidence Code, or any person
engaged in the dissemination of ideas or expression in any book or academic
journal, while engaged in the gathering, receiving, or processing of information for
communication to the public.
(2) Any action against any person or entity based upon the creation,
dissemination, exhibition, advertisement, or other similar promotion of any
dramatic, literary, musical, political, or artistic work, including, but not limited to, a
motion picture or television program, or an article published in a newspaper or
magazine of general circulation.
(3) Any nonprofit organization that receives more than 50 percent of its
annual revenues from federal, state, or local government grants, awards, programs,
or reimbursements for services rendered.
(e) If any trial court denies a special motion to strike on the grounds that the action or cause
of action is exempt pursuant to this section, the appeal provisions in subdivision (j) of
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All three groups have paid a lot of attention to the anti-SLAPP law. Since its
first enactment in 1992, the California Legislature has enacted three bills
amending section 425.16, and considered several more. On August 27, 2003, the
Legislature amended the law again, this time by adding a new section 425.17.'0
At this writing in July 2003, Westlaw lists 127 California appellate cases
mentioning section 425.16. While some mention the law only tangentially, or for
other reasons do not actually interpret the anti-SLAPP law, at least two thirds of
these contain substantive interpretations of the statute. Another 195 are
unpublished California decisions," and thirty-seven more have been decided in
federal court. 2 The 1999 amendment allowing immediate appeal 3 from denial of
an anti-SLAPP motion has started increasing the numbers of appeals.
Uncountable numbers of anti-SLAPP motions have been presented and decided
in California trial courts without being appealed. 4 Dozens of articles in law
Section 425.16 and paragraph (13) of subdivision (a) of Section 904.1 do not apply to
that action or cause of action.
10. S.B. 515 passed its final Senate vote and was enrolled on August 27, 2003-Governor Davis signed
it on September 6, and it was chaptered as Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2003. See text at note 9 above. For
more discussion of the new provision see text at notes 257-61 and 302 below.
11. Meaning not that they are actually not published, but that they are non-precedential and may not be
cited as authority. See Cal. R. Ct. 976-77. These have not been considered in this article.
12. The federal numbers also include a number of unpublished circuit court decisions, non-precedential
under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, and some which are not substantive interpretations of the law. "The feverish
pace with which appellate courts are dispatching issues under this statute is decidedly not subsiding and may, in
reality, be accelerating." Cashman, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 413. However, most of the appellate action has been at
the court of appeal level-in eleven years the Supreme Court has only decided six anti-SLAPP cases. At this
writing in July 2003 three grants of review are outstanding in cases mentioning the statute, but these mainly
concern other issues. Thus Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534 (2003), review
granted 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 403, 2003 WL 21418657, deals primarily with privacy concerns; Stroock & Stroock
& Lavan v. Tendler, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (2002), review granted 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655 (2003), deals with
substantive issues of malicious prosecution; and the SLAPP issue in Smith v. M.D., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315
(2003), review granted 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, was held moot on intermediate appeal. The California Anti-
SLAPP Project provides useful summaries of most significant federal and state cases interpreting section 425.16
on their website www.casp.net.
13. See Act of Oct. 10, 1999, ch. 960, section I (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 425.16(j)).
14. To reduce this uncountability, and provide an accurate universe of data for future research, the
Legislature in 1999 amended the law to require that
[a]ny party who files a special motion to strike pursuant to this section, and any party who files
an opposition to a special motion to strike, shall, promptly upon so filing, transmit to the
Judicial Council, by e-mail or fax, a copy of the endorsed-filed caption page of the motion or
opposition, a copy of any related notice of appeal or petition for a writ, and a conformed copy
of any order issued pursuant to this section, including any order granting or denying a special
motion to strike, discovery, or fees.
§ 425.16(k)(1) (added by Act of Oct. 10, 1999, ch. 960, section 1). The Judicial Council is obliged to "maintain
a public record of information transmitted pursuant to this subdivision for at least three years .. "
§ 425.16(k)(2). But county clerks do not appear to be enforcing subsection (k) statewide, so caption pages are
not always sent to the Judicial Council and the Council's information is fragmentary at best. For the "SLAPP
Special Motion Log," with available information arranged by county, see the Judicial Council's website, at
http://www.courtinfo.ca. gov/cgi-bin/slapp.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
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reviews and legal journals have refined understanding of the remedy in the
profession generally."
When the first cases interpreting the remedy were decided, beginning with
Wilcox v. Superior Court in 1994,6 California courts needed to determine nearly
every issue as a matter of first impression. Later, differing interpretations arose
among the courts of appeal. 7 But now, after eleven years of experience, a great
many questions have been authoritatively resolved, and the reach and operation
of the remedy is reasonably well understood. It seems useful to outline what has
been settled about the anti-SLAPP remedy, and what issues remain open.
II. QUESTIONS SETTLED IN ELEVEN YEARS OF EXPERIENCE
A. The Preamble
The preamble to the statute, before the broad construction amendment in
1997," originally stated:
The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing
increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public
interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public
significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through
abuse of the judicial process."
This suggested two related questions to later litigants. The first was whether,
to be subject to a special motion to strike, a defendant had to show that the
lawsuit was brought with the forbidden purpose or effect, and the second was
Despite subsection (k), it is still true that "we cannot ever know with precision how many [SLAPP suits]
have been filed and whether they are increasing or decreasing, because of imprecise cataloguing, inadequate
reporting, and a lack of centralized recording." PRING & CANAN, supra note 6, at 210 (footnote omitted). But
the time has probably passed where litigants often failed to invoke the anti-SLAPP remedy because they did not
know it was available. See, e.g., Pinnacle Holdings, Inc. v. Simon, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1430, 1437, 37 Cal. Rptr.
2d 778, 782 (1995): "Had respondents utilized the procedure set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,
the court might well have granted the motion."
15. As of July 12, 2003, Westlaw reports 41 articles with the terms 425.16 or SLAPP in the title, either
discussing section 425.16 substantively or noticing developments in the case law. There may be many more
under different titles. The same search in the Westlaw texts and treatises database yielded 20 entries.
16. 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (1994).
17. For example, courts differed on what constituted a "public issue." Compare, e.g., Church of
Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620 (1996), with, e.g., Zhao v. Wong, 48
Cal. App. 4th 1114, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (1996). This conflict was settled by Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope
& Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471 (1999). See discussion in Part II.B below. For a partial
list of issues still unsettled see Part IV.A below.
18. § 425.16(a) (added by Act of Aug. 11, 1997, ch. 271, section 1).
19. Id.
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whether the subjective purpose of the plaintiff made any difference. The
California Supreme Court has now decided, in Equilon Enterprises, LLC v.
Consumer Cause, Inc.,2° that the defendant need make no such showing, and the
plaintiff's intent is immaterial. The court held that there was nothing in the
statute (or in the legislative history) which would support such a requirement.
2'
The court also explicitly rejected an argument based on the language in the
preamble expressing legislative concern about actions brought "primarily to
2chill" First Amendment rights. The court noted that "a neutral, easily applied
definition for SLAPP's 'avoids subjective judgments' about filers' or targets'
motives, good faith, or intent."23
In a companion case decided the same day, City of Cotati v. Cashman,2 4 the
court held that the same reasons which forbade using an intent-to-chill test also
forbade a test based on whether there had been a chilling effect. 25 The court was
wise to insist that, whatever the legislative purpose as disclosed in the preamble,
the statute operates against claims "arising from" protected acts. 26 It is this
objective legal quality of the claims themselves, rather than the subjective
intentions of the filers or the practical effects on the targets, which determines
whether they are subject to the special motion to strike.27 Subjective intent is
20. 29 Cal. 4th 53, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (2002).
21. See id. at 58-59, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 511-12; see also, e.g., Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia, 103 Cal.
App. 4th 298, 316, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516, 528-29 (2002) (following Equilon).
22. See Equilon, 29 Cal. 4th at 59-62, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512-14.
23. Id. at 61-62, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 514 (quoting PRING & CANAN, supra note 6, at 8). The Court also
noted that an "intent to chill" requirement could conflict with the privilege statute, Civil Code section 47. "Were
we to impose an intent-to-chill proof requirement, petitioning that is absolutely privileged under the litigation
privilege would be deprived of anti-SLAPP protection whenever a moving defendant could not prove that the
plaintiff harbored an intent to chill that activity. Our construction avoids that anomalous result." Id. at 65, 124
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516-17. Finally, the Court referred to policy reasons against imposing such a requirement. Id.,
124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517 (quoting Braun, supra note 8, at 969 n.9):
"Imposing a requirement of establishing bad faith or ulterior motive adds a needless burden to
SLAPP targets seeking relief, and destroys the relatively value-free nature of existing anti-
SLAPP structures under which actions become suspect because of the circumstances of their
arising and the relief sought, without need to litigate motive."
Insofar as they differed from the Equilon holding, the court disapproved Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 85 Cal.
App. 4th 1356, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (2001), Foothills Townhome Ass'n v. Christiansen, 65 Cal. App. 4th 688,
76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516 (1998), Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. v. Investors Arbitration Services, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th
1633, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (1996), Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecommunications
Engineers, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1591, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491 (1996), Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal.
App. 4th 628, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620 (1996), and Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d
446 (1994). Equilon, 29 Cal. 4th at 68 n.5, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519 n.5. Linsco and Ericsson had been
disapproved before, on other points, in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1123
n.10, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 482 n.10 (1999). Of course these cases remain good law on other points-Wilcox
and Church of Scientology remain leading cases for most purposes.
24. 29 Cal. 4th 69, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 519 (2002).
25. Id. at 75, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524-25.
26. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2003).
27. See Equilon, 29 Cal. 4th at 58-59, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 511-512; Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th at 75, 124
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524. In deciding these cases the court relied heavily on earlier authority. See e.g., Fox
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notoriously hard to prove, and "actual" effects vary from case to case due to
accidental factors unrelated to the serious constitutional purposes of the statute.
A similar question was whether the statute should be applied only in so-
called "paradigm" cases. "The paradigm SLAPP is a suit filed by a large land
developer against environmental activists or a neighborhood association intended
to chill the defendants' continued political or legal opposition to the developers'
plans." ' Although the outrage inspired by such cases undoubtedly helped give
the proposed legislation the momentum needed for passage, it is now accepted
that the statute is not limited to these cases, and that "[b]oth legislative mandate
and judicial interpretation have expanded the application of the anti-SLAPP
statute beyond its paradigmatic origins. 29
At first, it was envisioned that the anti-SLAPP statute would be limited
to situations involving "powerful and wealthy plaintiffs, such as
developers, against impecunious protesters ...." The state Legislature,
however, has directed that Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 be
interpreted broadly. Furthermore, a number of courts have approved the
use of the anti-SLAPP statute by media defendants like those here.
Therefore, although in this situation, powerful corporate defendants are
employing the anti-SLAPP statute against individuals of lesser strength
and means, we are constrained by the authorities to permit its use against
plaintiffs of this ilk.3°
Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 89 Cal. App. 4th 294, 305-07, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 915-18 (2001)
(rejecting intent test); Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal. App. 4th 468, 480, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205,
213 (2000) (same).
28. Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 815, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 449 (1994).
29. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 623, 628, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 508 (2001); Vess v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003). Years earlier Matson v. Dvorak, 40 Cal. App. 4th
539, 547, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 885 (1995), held the same way: although the paradigm "provides useful
background regarding SLAPP suits, we are governed by familiar rules of statutory interpretation in evaluating
whether section 425.16 can be applied to this action." As the statute provided no paradigmatic limitation, the
courts would not add one. See id. The Legislature has reverted to the paradigmatic approach by adding
section 425.17, which carves out certain exceptions to the law. See text at note 9 above, and discussion in text at
notes 257-61 below.
30. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th at 628-29, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508-09 (footnotes
omitted). See also, e.g., Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, 864, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 46, 51-52 (1995):
More also argues section 425.16 was not intended to apply to media defendants in libel actions,
but only to situations such as that which the court in Wilcox [27 Cal. App. 4th at 815-16, 33
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449-50] characterized as a "paradigm SLAPP" suit, a suit filed by a powerful
land developer against individuals or organizations politically or legally opposed to the
development. As the Wilcox court noted, however, such suits are not limited to environmental
issues, nor are SLAPP suits always filed by powerful and wealthy plaintiffs against
impecunious protesters who annoy, delay, or frustrate plaintiffs' objectives.
Id. Accord. Sipple v. Found. for Nat'l Progress, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226, 240, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 685 (1999):
"Appellant's assertion that the statute was aimed at protecting economically weak individuals, rather than the
media, has been addressed and rejected in Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co." (citation
omitted).
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Likewise, although tort actions such as defamation, emotional distress, and
interference are the ones usually relied on in the typical SLAPP suit," actions of
a very different sort have been held amenable to striking under section 425.16.
Thus in Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, an action for relief from judgment
was held a SLAPP suit in the context of the prior litigation history between the
parties.32 Examples could be multiplied.33 In particular it has been authoritatively
held that the anti-SLAPP remedy can be applied to malicious prosecution actions,
even though these actions are excepted from the operation of the civil immunity
statute.34
31. "The favored causes of action in SLAPP suits are defamation, various business torts such as
interference with prospective economic advantage, nuisance and intentional infliction of emotional distress."
Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 816, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 449 (1994) (citing John C. Barker,
Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 395, 402-03
(1993)).
32. See Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 648-49, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 632
(1996):
[A]n examination of the history of the underlying litigation reveals that the instant action is
consistent with a pattern of conduct by the Church to employ every means, regardless of merit,
to frustrate or undermine Wollersheim's petition activity. When a party to a lawsuit engages in
a course of oppressive litigation conduct designed to discourage the opponents' right to utilize
the courts to seek legal redress, the trial court may properly apply section 425.16. We hold that
in making that determination, the trial court may properly consider the litigation history
between the parties.
Id.
33. See, e.g., ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625 (2001)
(abuse of process); Chavez v. Mendoza, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1083, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825 (2001) (malicious
prosecution); cf City of San Diego v. Dunkl, 86 Cal. App. 4th 384, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269 (2001) (action
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief re validity of proposed ballot measure); DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical
Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (2000) (action under California Consumer
Legal Remedies Act and California Unfair Practices Act); Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 4th
227, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313 (2002) (action against credit reporting agency under California Consumer Credit
Reporting Agencies Act and federal Fair Credit Reporting Act). But see Kajima Eng'g & Constr., Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles, 95 Cal. App. 4th 921, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187 (2002) (contract "related" cross-complaint in contract
action not subject to anti-SLAPP motion). Kajima distinguished Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal.
App. 4th 628, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620 (1996), where the statute was held to apply against the church, on the basis
that "the church's suit was not related to the transaction or occurrence which is the subject of the [church
member's] complaint, but [arose] out of the litigation process itself."' Kajima, 95 Cal. App. 4th at 933, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 196 (quoting Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 652, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634)
(alteration in original).
34. See Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal. 4th 728, 737, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636, 643 (2003):
Jarrow's attempted analogy between the litigation privilege and the anti-SLAPP statute is
inapt. As the Court of Appeal noted, the litigation privilege is an entirely different type of
statute than section 425.16. The former enshrines a substantive rule of law that grants absolute
immunity from tort liability for communications made in relation to judicial proceedings; the
latter is a procedural device for screening out meritless claims.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The 1997 amendment to the preamble operates so generally that it may be
considered the most fundamental and important contribution toward fixing an
understanding of the anti-SLAPP remedy. Amending the statute for the second
time, the Legislature added these words to the preamble's statement of legislative
purpose: "To this end, this section shall be construed broadly."35 This amendment
"was prompted by judicial decisions... that had narrowly construed it to include
an overall 'public issue' limitation."36 This statement of legislative intent has
permitted resolution of many knotty problems and has been explicitly relied on
by a significant number of courts as a key to their decisions.37
B. The Reach of the Statute
As the statute now reads, the criteria for coverage are as follows:
As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or
free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue" includes: (1) any written or oral statement
or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or
any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration
or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or writing
made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an
issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
35. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West Supp. 2003) (as amended by Act of Aug. 11, 1997, ch.
271, section 1).
36. Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1120, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 479
(1999). For a discussion of the legislative history see id. at 1119-21, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479-80.
37. See, e.g., id. at 1118, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478 (Legislature's "stated intent is best served" by
construing statute to encompass broadly "participation in official proceedings, generally, whether or not such
participation remains strictly focused on 'public' issues"); Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal. App.
4th 468, 477, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 211 (2000) ("[g]iven the mandate that we broadly construe the anti-SLAPP
statute, a single publication does not lose its 'public forum' character merely because it does not provide a
balanced point of view"); Dowling v. Zimmerman, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1400, 1425, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 194
(2001) ("purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute will be promoted by construing that statute broadly to permit a pro
se SLAPP defendant" to recover fees); Lam v. Ngo, 91 Cal. App. 4th 832, 835, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 584-85
(2001) ("[b]ecause the Legislature has specified that [§ 425.16] is to be construed broadly," filing deadlines
start fresh with amended complaint); Shekhter v. Fin. Indem. Co., 89 Cal. App. 4th 141, 150, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d
843, 849 (2001) (conclusion that one cause of action out of many can be stricken under section 425.16
"buttressed by the requirement" of broad construction). Examples could be multiplied. See City of Cotati v.
Cashman, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407, 413 (2001) aff'd 29 Cal. 4th 69, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 519 (2002): ("in 1997, the
frontier of SLAPP advanced materially beyond this dense cluster of rather obvious cases, no doubt prodded by
an amendment adding the Legislature's admonition that the statute 'shall be construed broadly."')
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free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.38
The fourth of these criteria was added in 1997. 39 Until 1999 there was still
considerable confusion as to just what the "public issue" requirement meant-
how "private" could an issue be and still permit coverage? What made an issue
one "of public interest"? 40 In Zhao v. Wong,4' for example, Zhao sued Wong for
slander for allegedly telling a newspaper reporter that Zhao murdered Wong's
brother.4 The court held the supposed slander was a private matter unconnected
to Wong's rights of free speech or petition, and therefore outside the reach of
section 425.16, even though Wong claimed to have made the statement "in an
effort to aid" litigation contesting a will.43 But in Averill v. Superior Court,
an
Averill privately asked her employer not to give money to a charity whose
intention to place a women's shelter in her neighborhood she opposed. The trial
court held the statute applicable, but only on the highly artificial ground that the
shelter only had a year's permit and the decision was therefore theoretically still
open to government action.45
In Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity,46 the Supreme Court's
first interpretation of the anti-SLAPP law, the Court disapproved Zhao and three
other cases that had taken the same narrow view. 47 Relying in part on the "broad
construction" amendment, 48 the court held that the "official proceeding" test
established a "bright line," and that any action arising from participation in such
38. § 425.16(e).
39. ActofAug. 11, 1997, ch. 271, section 1.
40. "The statute does not provide a definition for 'an issue of public interest,' and it is doubtful an all-
encompassing definition could be provided. However, the statute requires that there be some attributes of the
issue which make it one of public, rather than merely private, interest." Weinberg v. Feisel, 110 Cal. App. 4th
1122, 1132, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 392 (2003).
41. 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (1996).
42. See id. at 1118-19, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
43. Id. at 1131, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920.
44. 42 Cal. App. 4th 1170, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62 (1996).
45. See id. at 1 75-76, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 65. In ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993,
1002-03, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 635-36 (2001), the court limited Averill to its circumstance: a private
conversation about a public issue.
46. 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471 (1999).
47. See id. at 1123 n.10, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482 n.10. The reference, as with all others to the Supreme
Court, means the California Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court has not considered the California
anti-SLAPP remedy. The other cases disapproved by Briggs were Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. v. Investors
Arbitration Services, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1633, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (1996) (private arbitration of securities
disputes did not involve public issue; statute to be narrowly construed, following Zhao); Ericsson GE Mobile
Communications, Inc. v. C.S.!. Telecomms. Eng'rs, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1591, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491 (1996)
(consultant's report pursuant to contract not exercise of free speech or concerned with public issue); and
Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. App. 4th 713, 728-29, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 10-11
(1998) (upholding use of statute, but distinguishing Ericsson because tract map in question was "a matter of
public interest requiring public hearings," when either of these qualities would independently have sufficed).
48. See Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th at 1119-21, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479-80.
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a proceeding was covered by the law even without a public issue.49 Of the criteria
quoted above, the public issue requirement applied only to those in subsections
(e)(3) and (e)(4).50
[T]o the extent the acts attributed to defendant constitute exercises of its
right to petition under [§ 425.16(e)(1)], we need not inquire whether the
issue was "a public issue or an issue of public interest." Likewise, to the
extent the statements attributed to defendant were made "in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative [or similar]
body" under [§ 425.16(e)(2)], no such inquiry is necessary.
On the other hand, to the extent the statements attributed to defendant
were not made "in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a legislative [or similar] body" and may thus only be covered
under [§ 425.16(e)(3) and (4)], an inquiry must be made whether the
[statement] pertains to "a public issue or an issue of public interest.",
5'
Even private matters can now qualify for anti-SLAPP protection if they were,
for example, presented to a court or other official body.52 However,
the mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place
does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the
anti-SLAPP statute. Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have
been "triggered" by protected activity does not entail it is one arising
from such.53
The fact that government proceedings may be confidential does not exempt
reporting about them from the statute.-
Decisions after Briggs have found it much easier to deal with the
public/private question. For example, in Zhao v. Wong the court said that
"[m]edia coverage cannot by itself, however, create an issue of public interest
within the statutory meaning."" But it is now accepted that public interest in a
49. Id. at 1121-22, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471 at 480-81.
50. Id. at 1123, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481.
51. DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 566-67, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755,
759 (2000) (analyzing Briggs holding) (alteration in original).
52. See, e.g., Sipple v. Found. for Nat'l Progress, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226, 237-38, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677,
684 (1999) (custody dispute covered by section 425.16 because it was adjudicated in court).
53. Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 89, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 536 (2002) (quoting City of Cotati v.
Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th 69, 78, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 519, 527 (2002) (citations omitted); accord Gallimore v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1398, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 560, 568 (2002) (quoting
Navellier).
54. Braun v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1051-52, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 67 (1997).
55. Zhao v. Wong, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114, 1121, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 913 (1996), disapproved in
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1123 n.10, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 482 n.10
(1999). The Wollersheim case, decided earlier that year, took what is now the accepted view, stating in dictum
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topic (in the sense of fascination) can make it a "question of public interest,"
whether it is a significant matter or not. So in Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting
Corp.56 an "on-air discussion between.., talk-radio cohosts and their on-air
producer about a television show of significant interest to the public and the
media" was held to qualify.57 If that qualifies it is hard to see what popular
subject would not."
To take a somewhat more serious example, in DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical
Co. v. Superior Court,5" a consumer class action, the plaintiffs alleged that "[m]ore
than 1.8 million Americans have purchased Coumadin, an anti-coagulant medication,
for the prevention and treatment of blood clots that can lead to life-threatening
conditions such as stroke and pulmonary embolism.' The court held that "[b]oth the
number of persons allegedly affected and the seriousness of the conditions treated
establish the issue as one of public interest." 6' Before Briggs and the broad
construction amendment courts found such quantitative measures of public interest
problematic, even though they sometimes applied them.62 In Tuchscher Development
that "[tihe record reflects the fact that the Church is a matter of public interest, as evidenced by media coverage
and the extent of the Church's membership and assets." Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App.
4th 628, 651,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 633 (1996).
56. 97 Cal. App. 4th 798, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108 (2002).
57. Id. at 807, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
58. The program was Who Wants to Marry a Multimillionaire. The court said:
This program was a derivative of Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, which had proven successful
in generating viewership and advertising revenue. Before and after its network broadcast, Who
Wants to Marry a Multimillionaire generated considerable debate within the media on what its
advent signified about the condition of American society. One concern focused on the sort of
person willing to meet and marry a complete stranger on national television in exchange for the
notoriety and financial rewards associated with the Show and the presumed millionaire
lifestyle to be furnished by the groom.
Id. at 807-08, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115 (footnote omitted). To establish the show's notoriety, the court took
judicial notice of press articles about the show. Id. at 807 n.5, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115 n.5. Other subjects which
qualify for their broad general interest include domestic violence, see Sipple v. Found. for Nat'l Progress, 71
Cal. App. 4th 226, 238, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 684 (1999), and "the general topic of child molestation in youth
sports," see M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 623, 629, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 509 (2001). In
Monterey Plaza Hotel v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1057, 1064, 82 Cal. Rptr.
2d 10, 14 (1999) the court held a statement made on television "during a major labor dispute in the community"
constituted covered expression.
59. 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (2000).
60. Id. at 567, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
61. Id. See also Kids Against Pollution v. Cal. Dental Ass'n, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 373, 381 (2003) review
granted and opinion superseded by No. S117156, 2003 WL 22232740, at *1 (Cal. Sept. 17, 2003). ("public
pronouncements addressing the controversy over the assertedly widespread health effects of the mercury
contained in dental amalgam undoubtedly concern an issue of public importance"); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.
USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1110 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding coverage for "public advocacy activities in connection with
the use of Ritalin" to treat attention deficit disorder).
62. Even before Briggs, courts recognized that "[allthough matters of public interest include legislative
and governmental activities, they may also include activities that involve private persons and entities, especially
when a large, powerful organization may impact the lives of many individuals. Examples are product liability
suits, real estate or investment scams, etc." Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 650-
51, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 633 (1996) (citation omitted). The Wollersheim court also found that public interest
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Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port District,63 the court held that "[t]he
prospect of commercial and residential development of a substantial parcel of
bayfront property, with its potential environmental impacts, is plainly a matter of
public interest." 64 And the court in Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc.6 decided that
as "[m]ajor societal ills are issues of public interest," and "[n]ews reports concerning
current criminal activity serve important public interests," and as improper
prescription of controlled substances is a felony and "[flew problems affecting the
health and welfare of our population, particularly our young, cause greater concern
than the escalating use of controlled substances," a television show accusing a doctor
of improperly prescribing pain medication concerned an issue "of great public
interest. ' 66
61In Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
the court identified three general categories of cases which had been held to meet the
public issue requirement. These included cases where "the subject statements...
concerned a person or entity in the public eye, conduct that could directly affect a
large number of people beyond the direct participants[,] or a topic of widespread,
public interest. '
The definition of "public forum" has received less attention. The courts have
not been consistent as to whether a newspaper is a public forum.69 The law on this
can be "evidenced by media coverage." Id. For recent examples of the quantitative approach to the "public
issue" question see, e.g., ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1007-08, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d
625, 639 (2001) (12-24 million shares outstanding); Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d
1261, 1265 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (more than 18,000 investors). In Global Telemedia the court said the plaintiff
company
has inserted itself into the public arena and made itself a matter of public interest by means of
numerous press releases .... Further, a publicly traded company with many thousands of
investors is of public interest because its successes or failures will affect not only individual
investors, but in the case of large companies, potentially market sectors or the markets as a
whole. This is particularly so when the company voluntarily trumpets its good news through
the media in order to gain the attention of current and prospective investors. The fact that a
chat-room dedicated to [the company] has generated over 30,000 postings further indicates that
the company is of public interest.
Its status as a commercial enterprise does not ... insulate it from a SLAPP motion.
Id.
63. 106 Cal. App. 4th 1219, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 57 (2003).
64. Id. at 1234, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 69.
65. 110 Cal. App. 4th 156, I Cal. Rptr. 3d 536 (2003).
66. Id. at 164-65, I Cal. Rptr. 3d at 541 (citations omitted). The Legislature's attempt to apply special
SLAPP rules to commercial speech, found in the new statute, section 425.17, added by Stats. 2003 c. 338, see
supra note 9, will complicate the law in this area.
67. 105 Cal. App. 4th 913, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (2003).
68. Id. at 924, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89 (citations omitted).
69. Compare Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal. App. 4th 468, 478, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205,
212 (2000) (newsletter published by housing development residents a public forum because it was "a vehicle for
open discussion of public issues and was widely distributed to all interested parties...") with Lafayette
Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, 863 n.5, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 51 n.5 (1995)
(declining to hold the San Francisco Chronicle a public forum; dictum). Accord Rogers v. Home Shopping
Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973, 985 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("newspaper should not be deemed a 'public
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 34
question needs (and awaits) further development. But the Internet has been held
to constitute a public forum for anti-SLAPP purposes.70
More particular questions about the reach of the statute also have been
answered. Speech by governments and public officials is covered by the statute.7'
Speech by mail is covered.72 Things said about candidates or issues in an election
campaign are covered.73 The same seems to be true of prominent election• 74
participants who are not themselves candidates. Union elections count as
forum' for purposes of [section] 425.16"); Condit v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953 (E.D. Cal.
2002) ("newspaper should not be deemed a 'public forum' for purposes of [section] 425.16").
70. See ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1007, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 638 (2001)
(posting on "Raging Bull" website). Raging Bull is
"a financial website that organizes individual bulletin boards or 'chat-rooms,' each one
dedicated to a single publicly traded company. The chat-rooms are open and free to anyone
who wants to read the messages; membership is also free and entitles the member to post
messages.... Unlike many traditional media, there are no controls on the postings. Literally
anyone who has access to the Internet has access to the chat-rooms."
Id. (quoting Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Accord MCSi,
Inc. v. Woods, 2003 WL 554638, *2 (N.D. Cal.) ("A web site that organizes chat rooms dedicated to discussion
of a large, publicly-traded corporation is a 'public forum' for purposes of CCP § 425.16" (citing
ComputerXpress, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 1006, 113 Cal. Rptr 2d at 638)); see also Global Telemedia Int'l, 132 F.
Supp. 2d at 1265 (holding such postings covered by section 425.16). Posting an SEC complaint on the Internet
"amounted to a statement in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest." ComputerXpress, 93
Cal. App. 4th at 1009-10, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640. Cf. Batzel v. Smith, 2001 WL 1893843, *7 (C.D. Cal.)
appeal dismissed on other grounds, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (neither side contended a website was not a
"place open to the public" or a "public forum.").
However, a court of appeal has recently sounded a cautionary note. "The fact that the statements at issue
in Nicosia [v. De Rooy, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1999)] happen to have been published on a website
hardly means the case stands for the proposition that any statement published on any website in any context is
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, much less that it comes within subdivision (e)(2)." Du Charme v. Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 45, 110 Cal. App. 4th 107, 114, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501, 506 (2003).
71. See Bradbury v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1108, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (1996) (district
attorney); Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. App. 4th 713, 730, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1,
11 (1998) (county government) disapproved on other grounds by Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope &
Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1123 n.5, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 482 n.5 (1999)); Schroeder v. Irvine City
Council, 97 Cal. App. 4th 174, 183 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330, 337 n.3 (2002) (city council). In Schroeder the
court inserted a disclaimer into its footnote, saying "we do not categorically hold that all lawsuits against
governmental agencies and officials automatically qualify for treatment under section 425.16 . I.." Id.
72. See Macias v. Hartwell, 55 Cal. App. 4th 669, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (1997).
73. See, e.g., Conroy v. Spitzer, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1446, 1451-54, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 447-48 (1999).
Section 425.16 applies to suits involving statements made during a political campaign
(Beilenson v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal. App. 4th 944, 950 [52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357]
[campaign mailer]), statements made in connection with a recall election (Robertson v.
Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal. App. 4th 347, 352 [42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464] [campaign mailer]),
statements made in a political flyer concerning a candidate (Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.
App. 4th 539, 548, [46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880]), and statements made in a recall petition (Evans v.
Unkow (1995) 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1493-94 [45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624]).
Macias, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 672, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224. To this list may now be added Roberts v. Los Angeles
County BarAss'n., 105 Cal. App. 4th 604, 614, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 552 (2003) (bar association's evaluation
of judicial candidate). "Our Constitution protects everyone--even politicians." Beilenson v. Superior Court, 44
Cal. App. 4th 944, 946, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 359 (1996).
74. See Sipple v. Found. for Nat'l Progress, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226, 239-40, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 685
(1999) "[T]he details of appellant's career and appellant's ability to capitalize on domestic violence issues in his
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elections for this purpose.75 But although activities related to an election are
covered, where the election-related activity is itself illegal, the statute offers no
protection, because the activity was not a "valid" exercise of constitutional rights
71as stated in the preamble. It does not matter whether the speech is made on
behalf of others, 7 and "[t]here is no requirement that the writing or speech be
advertising campaigns for politicians known around the world, while allegedly committing violence against his
former wives, are public issues, and the article is subject to the protection of section 425.16." Id.
75. See Macias, 55 Cal. App. 4th 669, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222.
76. See Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1360-61, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 866-67
(2001) (laundering of campaign contributions). Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West Supp.
2003) ("the valid exercise of the constitutional rights... ") (emphasis added). In Paul for Council the court
noted that
the probability that the Legislature intended to give defendants section 425.16 protection from
a lawsuit based on injuries they are alleged to have caused by their illegal campaign money
laundering scheme is as unlikely as the probability that such protection would exist for them if
they injured plaintiff while robbing a bank to obtain the money for the campaign contributions
or while hijacking a car to drive the campaign contributions to the post office for mailing.
Under the facts demonstrated by this record, we cannot permit defendants to wrap themselves
in this vital legislation.
Paul for Council, 85 Cal. App. 4th at 1366, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871. But the court also noted that the illegality
of the laundering was undisputed--"had there been a factual dispute as to the legality of defendants' actions,
then we could not so easily have disposed of defendants' motion." Id. at 1367, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871.
For a case presenting such a factual dispute, see Kashian v. Harriman, 98 Cal. App. 4th 892, 910, 120
Cal. Rptr. 2d 576, 590 (2002), where the court distinguished Paul for Council on that basis, saying "[t]his is just
such a case, where the legality of Harriman's litigation activities is a matter of considerable dispute." The court
continued:
The burden thus shifted to Kashian to make a prima facie showing sufficient to establish a
probability of prevailing. In short, conduct that would otherwise come within the scope of the
anti-SLAPP statute does not lose its coverage (or... the protection of the litigation privilege)
simply because it is alleged to have been unlawful or unethical. If that were the test, the statute
(and the privilege) would be meaningless.
id. at 910-11, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590 (footnote omitted). See also Governor Gray Davis Committee v.
American Taxpayers Alliance, 102 Cal. App. 4th 449, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534 (2002), where the plaintiff sued for
injunctive relief to stop the defendant from uttering political speech without complying with the Political
Reform Act of 1974, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8100 et seq. A SLAPP motion was denied, and the denial reversed.
The court of appeal noted that the "appellant neither has conceded nor does the evidence conclusively establish
the illegality of its communications [which it claimed were] ... protected speech that cannot be regulated by the
Political Reform Act, and consequently no violation of law occurred." Id. at 459, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 542. Since
the "legality of appellant's exercise of a constitutionally protected right [is] in dispute in the action," a prima
facie case has been made on the requirement of an act in furtherance of free speech. Id. at 460, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 542. The court concluded that "[iun view of appellant's successful First Amendment defense to the action,
respondent has failed to establish a likelihood of prevailing on the merits," and so the Davis Committee lost on
both counts. Id. at 472, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 552-53.
In Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia, 103 Cal. App. 4th 298, 317, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516, 529 (2002), the court
held an action against a bank, complaining of a challenged collection action, prima facie arose out of protected
activity, but specifically noted that "[tihis conclusion does not imply that the distant forum abuse alleged by the
Yus was a valid exercise of Banks' constitutional rights. The lawfulness of the defendant's petitioning activity
is generally not at issue in the 'arising from' prong of the anti-SLAPP inquiry... " Id. In a footnote the court
said that "the illegality of Banks' petitioning activity [has not] been effectively conceded, or conclusively
established by the evidence," citing Governor Gray Davis Committee, 102 Cal. App. 4th at 459, 125 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 534. Id. at 317 n.3, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529 n.3.
77. See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1116-17, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d
471,476-77 (1999).
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promulgated directly to the official body.""8 And "recruiting and encouraging
others to speak out on a matter of public interest [comes] within the protection of
section 425.16."79
A recent case interpreted for the first time the statutory language "conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or... free
speech. .. ."0 In Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc.," a television program
segment called "Caught in the Act" sent reporters to a doctor suspected of
improperly prescribing pain medication. The reporters secretly recorded the
proceedings and ran a story accusing the doctor of improprieties. Dr. Lieberman
sued, and the station moved to strike. Lieberman contended that the secret
recording was illegal and so not protected. The court agreed that news-gathering
12was not entitled to the same protection as news-reporting. But, the court
continued,
[n]either the parties nor we have found authority considering the question
whether newsgathering is conduct in furtherance of the news media's
exercise of its right of free speech. Section 425.16, subdivision (a),
mandates, however, that the statute be construed broadly, and the
statute's reach is not restricted to speech, but expressly applies to
conduct. Further, that conduct is not limited to the exercise of its right of
free speech, but to all conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the right
of free speech in connection with a public issue.
Furtherance means helping to advance, assisting. (See Oxford English
Dictionary Online (2d ed. 1989).) Reporting the news is free speech.
Reporting the news usually requires the assistance of newsgathering,
which therefore can be construed as undertaken in furtherance of the
news media's right to free speech. Because the surreptitious recordings
here were in aid of and were incorporated into a broadcast in connection
of a public issue, we conclude that Lieberman's complaint fell within the
scope of section 425.16.3
78. Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 17, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 357 (1995).
79. Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 784, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830,
835 (1996) (citing Ludwig, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 18, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 357); see also Wilcox v. Superior Court,
27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 826-27, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 456-57 (1994) (fund-raising).
80. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(4) (West Supp. 2003) (emphasis added). Similar language
appears in subsection (b)(1).
81. 110 Cal. App. 4th 156, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 536 (2003).
82. Id. at 165, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 542.
83. Id. at 166, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 542 (citations omitted).
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The requirement that the protected First Amendment activity be "valid" does
not mean the movant has a duty to establish its validity.
"The Legislature did not intend that in order to invoke the special motion
to strike the defendant must first establish her actions are constitutionally
protected under the First Amendment as a matter of law. If this were the
case then the [secondary] inquiry as to whether the plaintiff has
established a probability of success would be superfluous." "Rather, any
'claimed illegitimacy of the defendant's acts is an issue which the
plaintiff must raise and support in the context of the discharge of the
plaintiff's [secondary] burden to provide a prima facie showing of the
merits of the plaintiff's case."'
Expression in the course of litigation is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute
because of the constitutional right of petition." It is also privileged under the civil
immunity statute." Because privilege will defeat an action based on a privileged
expression, by definition such an action cannot prevail on its merits and so will
be vulnerable to a section 425.16 motion to strike." Activity incidental to
litigation-for example the fund-raising in Wilcox"8-is protected, as is
preliminary activity before filing." It makes no difference who pays for or
84. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg, 107 Cal. App. 4th 568, 583, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 801 (2003)
(quoting Navellier v. Sletton, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94-95, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 540-41 (2002)) (alterations in
original) (citations omitted). See also Lieberman, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 165, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 542.
It is not the defendant's burden in bringing a SLAPP motion to establish that the challenged
cause of action is constitutionally protected as a matter of law. Once the defendant shows that
the cause of action arose from acts done in furtherance of an exercise of free speech, it
becomes the plaintiffs burden to establish that the acts are not protected by the First
Amendment.
Id. (citations omitted).
85. See, e.g., Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1115, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d
471, 476 (1999). Accord, e.g., Chavez v. Mendoza, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1083, 1087, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825, 828
(2001).
86. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West Supp. 2003) which provides in pertinent part: "A privileged publication
or broadcast is one made: * * * (b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other
official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by
law and reviewable ... [under California Civil Procedure section 1084 and following sections], except .. "
87. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 823-25, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 454-55
(1994).
88. See id. at 826-27, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 456-57.
89. See, e.g., Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d
830 (1996). This case concerned the proceeds of a recording made by Hollywood celebrities, supposedly for the
benefit of animal protection charities. The heirs of the actress Audrey Hepburn, one of the celebrities involved,
were preparing to complain to the state Attorney General about possible misapplication of royalties from the
recording, and their law firm contacted other participating celebrities to confirm their support for the heirs'
action. It was this activity the SLAPP plaintiffs complained of.
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"instigate[s]" the litigation.90 And abusive litigation tactics can, if bad enough, be
considered a burden on the right of petition.9
But there are limits-"[a] lawsuit seeking redress for a harassing investigation
of topics unrelated to those under consideration in an official proceeding is not the
type of 'abuse of the judicial process' that the Legislature sought to prevent when it
enacted the anti-SLAPP statute." 92 And
a cross-complaint or independent lawsuit filed in response to, or in
retaliation for, threatened or actual litigation is not subject to the anti-
SLAPP statute simply because it may be viewed as an oppressive
litigation tactic. No lawsuit is properly subject to a special motion to
strike under section 425.16 unless its allegations arise from acts in
furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.9
Thus in Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 94 Gallimore
complained of unfair insurance practices by State Farm, using documents from a
California Department of Insurance investigation. State Farm moved to strike,
claiming Gallimore's action interfered with its responses in a Department of
Insurance proceeding the documents related to.9' The court of appeal reversed a
strike order because the acts Gallimore complained of did not arise from the state
90. See Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 18, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 357 (1995): "We see no
meaningful difference between a person who supports and encourages the filing of a lawsuit, and one who
supports and encourages a third party to speak out publicly on a matter of public interest." Id.
91. "[W]hen a litigant continuously and unsuccessfully uses the litigation process in filing unmeritorious
motions, appeals and lawsuits, such actions have constitutional implications which may be reviewed on a
motion under section 425.16." Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 649, 49 Cal. Rptr.
2d 620, 632 (1996). The court characterized the Church's tactics as an attempt to "use[] the litigation process to
bludgeon the opponent into submission." Id.
In a recent case, Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia, 103 Cal. App. 4th 298, 316, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516, 529
(2002), the court held that an action challenging credit card collection practices arose from protected activity.
It is ironic that a lawsuit challenging distant forum abuse-a practice calculated to prevent the
Yus' "public participation" in the collection action against them-should itself meet the
threshold definition of a SLAPP suit, but that is the result under the anti-SLAPP statute. Since
the Yus' case is based entirely on the collection action Banks filed against them, we conclude
that it satisfies the "arising from" standard.
Id.
92. Paul v. Friedman, 95 Cal. App. 4th 853, 861, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82, 88 (2002). The court noted:
"There must be a connection with an issue under review in that proceeding. In [People ex rel.] 20th Century
Insurance [Co. v. Building Permit Consultants, Inc., 86 Cal. App. 4th 280, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 71 (2000)], there
was a connection to an issue but no pending proceeding; here, there is a pending proceeding, but no connection
to an issue before the tribunal." Id. at 867, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93.
93. Kajima Eng'g and Constr., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 95 Cal. App. 4th 921, 924, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d
187, 189 (2002).
94. 102 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 560 (2002).
95. id. at 1391-93, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562-64.
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proceeding but from State Farm's insurance conduct itself."' There was a similar
result in Santa Monica Rent Control Board v. Pearl Street, LLC,97 where the acts
complained of were improper residential rental practices rather than a representation
to the Board ancillary to those practices." In a surprising decision, which
prompted a vigorous dissent by three justices (Brown, Baxter and Chin), the
Supreme Court held in Navellier v. Sletten 9 that an action against a party who
filed a counterclaim in federal court on claims he had released by an earlier
settlement could be attacked as a SLAPP because it was based not on the
underlying controversy but on the defendant's petitioning act of filing his
claim.iro "Sletten's negotiation and execution of the Release... involved
'statement[s] or writing[s] made in connection with an issue under consideration
or review by a ... judicial body' (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)), i.e., the federal district
court, and his arguments respecting the Release's validity were 'statement[s] or
writing[s] made before a... judicial proceeding' (id., subd. (e)(1))...... This
decision may be expected to spawn a good deal of debate as parties try to
characterize cross-actions and litigation maneuvering as SLAPP suits.
The range of official proceedings has been significantly expanded from a
basic courts-and-tribunals approach. For example, an investigative audit by the
State Auditor under the Reporting of Improper Governmental Activities 
Act'12
96. Id. at 1400, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570. The court said that State Farm had "clearly confuse[d] the acts
of alleged misconduct with the evidence needed to prove them." Id. Having reversed the strike order, the court
of appeal also reversed the fee award. Id. at 1400-01, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570.
Beach v. Harco Nat'l Ins. Co., 110 Cal. App. 4th 82, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454 (2003), a bad faith action, is
similar: the policy-holder complained of nine separate failures and delays in processing his claim, but none of
them involved protected conduct by the insurance company.
Here, plaintiff asserts that conduct by Harco amounted to bad faith in the handling of plaintiffs claim for
uninsured motorist coverage. The conduct centers on the delay in responding to and resolving plaintiffs
claim. None of this conduct involved Harco's right to petition. While communications preparatory to
bringing (or responding to) an action or arbitration might, under the proper circumstances, be deemed to
fall within the scope of section 425.16, the conduct complained of here does not cross this threshold. The
outlined actions (or nonactions) occurred as part of a coverage dispute between an insurer and its insured,
and occurred long before any arbitration or other proceeding commenced.
Id. at 94, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 463 (citations omitted).
97. 109 Cal. App. 4th 1308, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 903 (2003).
98. Id. at 1318, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910. In Santa Monica, when residential properties are removed from
the rental market and are then returned to it, the landlord is allowed to charge only the pre-removal rent for the
first post-restoration tenancy. When that tenancy ends, though, a landlord is allowed to charge a market rate.
Pearl Street allegedly created sham tenancies to satisfy the requirement for first tenancies, then had them end,
and notified the Board of its intention to charge market rates. The Board sued to stop Pearl Street from doing
this, and Pearl Street moved to strike. The Court held that "while this suit may have been 'triggered by'
defendants' submission of... documents to the Board, it is not true that this suit is based on the filing of such
papers. Rather, the suit is based on activity that preceded the filing of the papers." Id. The court noted that this
"involve[d] a situation quite similar to one... in Gallimore." id. at 1317, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 909.
99. 29 Cal. 4th 82, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002).
100. Id. at 90, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 537.
101. id. (alterations in original). On remand the court of appeal decided the plaintiff had not met his
burden of showing likelihood of success on the merits, and so upheld the strike order. See Navellier v. Sletten,
106 Cal. App. 4th 763, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 201 (2003).
102. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8547-8547.12 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003).
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has been held an "official proceeding authorized by law" for anti-SLAPP
purposes.03 In a 1997 case the anti-SLAPP remedy was held to reach a dispute
within a residential community only because the community was a publicly
subsidized cooperative housing project, a factor which should have made no
difference.' °4 Three years later a court found no difficulty in holding that "[a]
homeowners association board is in effect 'a quasi-government entity paralleling
in almost every case the powers, duties, and responsibilities of a municipal
government,"' and so proceedings before it are covered by section 425.16.'0°
"The definition of 'public interest' within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP
statute," the court held, "has been broadly construed to include not only
governmental matters, but also private conduct that impacts a broad segment of
society and/or that affects a community in a manner similar to that of a
governmental enuty. As with litigation, coverage for official proceedings
extends to preliminary activity.' ° And a court recently held that demands to fire a
reporter for the content of her coverage of litigation fell within the protection "for
statements made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
judicial body."'1
103. Braun v. Chronicle Publ'g Co,, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1048, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 65 (1997).
104. See Ray Delgado, Elderly Battling Company Lawsuits; Management Sues Five Seniors for Alleged
Complaints; Senior Power, S.F. EXAINER, Oct. 18, 1997, at Al (Freedom Homes case), discussed in Braun,
supra note 8, at 968 and n.5.
105. Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal. App. 4th 468, 475, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 210,
(citing Cohen v. Kite Hill Cmty Ass'n, 142 Cal. App. 3d 642, 651, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209, 214 (1983)). The Cohen
case dealt primarily with the duty a homeowners' association owes a member, but it did quote an evocative
passage from a 1976 law review article, noting what was even then the "increasingly 'quasi-governmental'
nature of the responsibilities of such associations .... Id.
The other essential role directly relates to the association's regulatory powers; and upon
analysis of the association's functions, one clearly sees the association as a quasi-government
entity paralleling in almost every case the powers, duties, and responsibilities of a municipal
government. As a 'mini-government,' the association provides to its members, in almost
every case, utility services, road maintenance, street and common area lighting, and refuse
removal. In many cases, it also provides security services and various forms of
communication within the community. There is, moreover, a clear analogy to the municipal
police and public safety functions. All of these functions are financed through assessments or
taxes levied upon the members of the community, with powers vested in the board of
directors, council of co-owners, board of managers, or other similar body clearly analogous to
the governing body of a municipality. Terminology varies from region to region; however,
the duties and responsibilities remain the same.
Wayne S. Hyatt & James B. Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and Administration of
Condominium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 918 (1976) (footnotes omitted)
(quoted in Cohen, supra).
106. Damon, 85 Cal. App. 4th at 479, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. Similarly, in a 1998 case, statements
made in a homeowners' association meeting about assessments were held to have "involved matters of
sufficient public interest made in a sufficiently public forum to invoke the protection of section 425.16."
Foothills Townhome Ass'n v. Christiansen, 65 Cal. App. 4th 688, 695-96, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516, 520 (1998).
107. See, e.g., Dixon v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 4th 733, 743-44, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 694-95
(1994) (statutory public comment process).
108. Finke v. Walt Disney Co., 110 Cal. App. 4th 1210, 1229, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 453 (2003).
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Other forms of constitutionally protected expression also come within the
statute. The first case decided under section 425.16 upheld its use against an
action arising from a peaceful but issue-related economic boycott.' °9 The same
case held that "commercial speech" was also covered."' And "[t]he dissemination
of standards of practice by a voluntary professional organization constitutes an
exercise of the right of free speech" for purposes of the statute."' But as with
litigation activity, there are limits-to be protected by the anti-SLAPP law, the
activity must be protected by the Constitution. As the Wilcox court noted:
if the defendant's act was a lawsuit against a developer the defendant would
have a prima facie First Amendment defense. But, if the defendant's act was
burning down the developer's office as a political protest the defendant's
motion to strike could be summarily denied without putting the developer to
the burden of establishing the probability of success on the merits in a tort
suit against defendant."2
But although the criteria for statutory coverage have expanded in the past eleven
years," 3 it would be wrong to think they are a dead letter, and the statute covers
everything. For example, in People ex rel. 20th Century Insurance Co. v. Building
114Permit Consultants, Inc., an insurance company sued a repair estimation company,
claiming a scheme to defraud it. The court denied a motion to strike, holding this
outside the reach of the statute." 5 Likewise in Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan
109. See Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 820-21, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 453 (1994)
(court reporters' boycott of reporting agency).
110. See id. at 822 n.6, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454 n.6. However, the statute "does not apply in every case
where the defendant may be able to raise a First Amendment defense to a cause of action." Id. at 819, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 451-52. Accord Paul v. Friedman, 95 Cal. App. 4th 853, 864 n.20, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82, 91 n.20
(2002) (quoting Wilcox).
The Wilcox court's footnote about commercial speech read in part:
Cross-complainants have not cited, nor has our research disclosed, any legislative history
suggesting the Legislature intended to exclude commercial speech from the protection
afforded by section 425.16. To the contrary, the statute has been criticized for the very reason
it does cover commercial speech. Furthermore, the view SLAPP suits do not include suits
aimed at commercial speech was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in In re Airport Car Rental
Antitrust Litigation (9th Cir. 1982) 693 F.2d 84, 86.
Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 822 n.6, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454 n.6 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit case the
court cited was of course decided long before the present statute was enacted. And the broad statements about
commercial speech have been brought into question by later cases-see, e.g., Nagel v. Twin Labs., Inc., 109
Cal. App. 4th 39, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 420 (2003). Clarification is needed from the California Supreme Court. See
discussion infra text accompanying notes 256-62; supra note 9.
1l1. Kids Against Pollution v. Cal. Dental Ass'n, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 373, 388 (2003) review granted and
opinion superseded by No. S 117156, 2003 WL 22232740, at * 1 (Cal. Sept. 17, 2003).
112. Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 820, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452-53.
113. See Governor Gray Davis Comm. v. Am. Taxpayers Alliance, 102 Cal. App. 4th 449, 455, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 534, 539 (2002) ("ever widening haven of the SLAPP statute").
114. 86 Cal. App. 4th 280, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 71 (2000).
115. Id. at 285, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 75.
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Computer Group, Inc., a business's statements "to the market" about competitors
and their products were held outside the statute.1 7 A citizen's arrest is not
petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.'' In State Farm General
Insurance Co. v. Majorino"9 the court held "an insurance company's declaratory
relief action to resolve coverage issues [did] not qualify as a SLAPP suit.' "O In
Weinberg v. Feisel,121 the court rejected a claim that an accusation of theft by one
member of a small collecting society against another member was a public issue
within the statute.22 And in Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, 3 the court was firm that a defamation action involving a
dispute over the suspension of a supervisor who oversaw eight janitors was not a
matter of public interest, even though the workplace issues involved were of public
interest, the janitors worked at a state-run facility, and the union published and
circulated commentary about the dispute. 24
Moreover, just because an action was filed after exercise of protected rights
of speech or petition, it is not necessarily subject to the anti-SLAPP law, even if
it was filed in retaliation for the exercise. For the action to be covered, the
activity complained of must itself have been protected.12 And a court of appealrecently announced a new rule:
We therefore hold that in order to satisfy the public issue/issue of public
interest requirement of subdivisions (e)(3) and (4) of the anti-SLAPP
statute, in cases where the issue is not of interest to the public at large,
but rather to a limited, but definable portion of the public (a private
group, organization, or community), the constitutionally protected
activity must, at a minimum, occur in the context of an ongoing
116. 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
117. See also MCSi, Inc. v. Woods, No. C-02-02865JF (RS), 2003 WL 554638, *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25,
2003) (reaching a similar result based on Globetrotter.).
118. See Wang v. Hartunian, Il1 Cal. App. 4th 744, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 909 (2003).
119. 99 Cal. App. 4th 974, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719, 720 (2002).
120. Id. at 975, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 720.
121. 110 Cal. App. 4th 1122, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385 (2003).
122. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that his dispute with plaintiff was anything other than a private
dispute between private parties. The fact that defendant allegedly was able to vilify plaintiff in the eyes of at
least some people establishes only that he was at least partially successful in his campaign of vilification; it does
not establish that he was acting on a matter of public interest.
Id. at 1134, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 394.
123. 105 Cal. App. 4th 913, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (2003).
124. This clearly reasoned opinion contains a scholarly and detailed treatment of several aspects of the
public issue requirement. It was followed and relied on, in an even less controversial labor context, in Du
Charne v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 45, 110 Cal. App. 4th 107, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d
501 (2003) (public notice of dismissal of union official not within statute).
125. See ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1003, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 635-36
(2001). Thus if a creditor has delayed filing an action for debt, and then does so after the debtor has picketed his
office to protest his stand on a public issue, his action, even though retaliatory, is not a SLAPP suit because it
complains not of protected activity, but of debt. See, e.g., the hypothetical example of arson in Wilcox, quoted
supra in text at note 112.
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controversy, dispute or discussion, such that it warrants protection by a
statute that embodies the public policy of encouraging participation in
matters of public significance.
2
1
The limits on anti-SLAPP protection for advertising are becoming clearer. In
DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court 27 the court found
protection because the drug product involved (Coumadin) was taken by 1.8
million Americans for a life-threatening condition."' This case has since been
cited by advertisers responding to false advertising claims with anti-SLAPP
motions. '29 But in Consumer Justice Center v. Trimedica International, Inc., the
court distinguished claims for Grobust, said to increase breast size in women, as
not meeting the public issue test.'3° The court went further and held that specific
claims about a specific product would rarely meet that test, stating
[n]o logical interpretation.., suggests that "matters of public significance"
includes specific advertising statements about a particular commercial
product, absent facts which truly make that product a matter of genuine
public interest, as was the case in DuPont. If we were to do so, nearly any
product could claim its speech was about a topic of public interest.
Construing the statute in this manner would allow every defendant in every
false advertising case (or nearly any case that involves any type of speech) to
bring a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute.... We do not
believe the Legislature intended the statute to be construed in such a
131manner....
In Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. 32 labeling and website claims about
ingredients of a "dietary supplement" were held outside the reach of the anti-
SLAPP remedy, because they were commercial speech "at the other end of the
spectrum" from political speech. 13 3 It would be helpful for the Supreme Court to
126. Du Charme, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 119, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 510 (footnote omitted).
127. 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (2000).
128. Id. at 567, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759. Also some of DuPont's speech was directed toward regulatory
bodies and constituted petitioning activity. Id. at 566-67, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
129. For example, in Consumer Justice Center v. Trimedica International, Inc., 107 Cal. App. 4th 595,
601, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 191, 194 (2003); Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. 109 Cal. App. 4th 39, 49-50, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 420, 427 (2003).
130. 107 Cal. App. 4th at 601-02, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194-95.
131. Id. at 602, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195. As a later opinion put it, "Trimedica ... effectively stand[s] for
the rejection of what might be called the synecdoche theory of public issue in the anti-SLAPP statute. The part
is not synonymous with the greater whole. Selling an herbal breast enlargement product is not a disquisition on
alternative medicine." Commonwealth Energy Corp. v. Investor Data Exch., Inc., 110 Cal. App. 4th 26, 34, 1
Cal. Rptr. 3d 340, 395 (2003). In Commonwealth Energy the court held a telemarketer's pitch unprotected for
anti-SLAPP purposes, noting that "[j]ust because you are selling something that is intrinsically important does
not mean that the public is interested in the fact that you are selling it." Id.
132. 109 Cal. App. 4th 39, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 420 (2003).
133. Id. at 47, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425. The court relied heavily on the California Supreme Court's
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issue a definitive statement of the application of section 425.16 to commercial
speech. The Legislature's attempt to apply special SLAPP rules to commercial
speech, found in the new section 425.17, "will greatly complicate the emerging
law in this area. Because the statute restricts the application of a special motion
to strike to a "cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person
in furtherance of the person's right of ... free speech . . . , the question has
arisen how far it protects a lawyer who is speaking on behalf of a client. In
Shekhter v. Financial Indemnity Co. (2001)"' the court declined to reach this
issue, as the lawyer spoke for his client not only in court but to reporters outside
the courtroom. But in Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2002)137 the court
decided that when a lawyer "acting as an advocate, filed papers and presented
arguments in the underlying litigation, his advocacy activities arose out of the
exercise of the right of free expression," and so is protected by section 425.16.138
C. Practice Under the Statute
Despite the relatively straightforward nature of the motion to strike, the
details of procedure and burden of proof have proved complex. After eleven
years, however, most of the more difficult problems have been settled, and the
elements of a proceeding under the statute are well understood.
Subsection (f) provides that
[t]he special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the
complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it
deems proper. The motion shall be noticed for hearing not more than 30
days after service unless the docket conditions of the court require a later
hearing. 39
It has now been decided that the 60-day period starts fresh from the filing of
an amended complaint-the alternative would permit abuses in pleading.'
0
discussion of commercial speech in Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 (2002).
Certiorari was granted in the Kasky case, see 537 U.S. 1099 (2003), but was dismissed as improvidently
granted, see 123 S.Ct. 2554 (2003).
134. See supra note 9.
135. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
136. 89 Cal. App. 4th 141, 153-54, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 851-52 (2001).
137. 97 Cal. App. 4th 1, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388 (2002), aff'd 31 Cal. 4th 728, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (2003).
138. Id. at 19, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403. It may appear to make more sense to ground the lawyer's
protection in the civil immunity statute, which protects communications made "in any.. . judicial proceeding."
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(b)(2) (West Supp. 2003). See also White v. Lieberman, 103 Cal. App. 4th 210, 221,
126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 608, 615 (2002) (attorney acting for clients has benefit of section 425.16). But the Supreme
Court specifically rejected this approach in its opinion affirming Jarrow, see 31 Cal. 4th at 737, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d
at 643.
139. Failure to do this can be fatal. See Decker v. U.D. Registry, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1382, 1387-90, 129
Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 894-97 (2003).
140. Lam v. Ngo, 91 Cal. App. 4th 832, 835, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 584-85 (2001); Yu v. Signet
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The parameters for deciding SLAPP motions were defined in the Wilcox case
in 1994, as noted the first appellate case decided under the new statute. 4' The
burden lies first upon the party filing the motion to make a prima facie case that
the causes of action sought to be stricken fall within the ambit of the statute.'
"4
The Wilcox court decided this based on the legislative history-a version of the
legislation vetoed in 1990 had placed the burden entirely on the plaintiff to
justify the action.'43 The court stated a rubric which has formed the basis for
deciding SLAPP motions ever since: "placing the initial burden on the defendant
to show the action should be tested under the provisions of subdivision (b) and
the burden on the plaintiff to show the action meets that test. ' ' '-
Ordinarily (although not always), this prima facie requirement is met by
showing that the action complained of was privileged, either under the state or
federal constitution or under the civil immunity statute.' 4 Once this prima facie
test has been met, under Wilcox and subsequent cases the burden shifts to the
plaintiff whose pleading is being attacked to show a reasonable probability of
prevailing on the merits.'46 If it can make this showing the motion fails. '4v It is
Bank/Virginia, 103 Cal. App. 4th 298, 314, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516, 527 (2002). Both cases relied on a federal
decision to the same effect. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127,
1129 (N.D. Cal. 1999). If the cross-complaint is served by mail, an additional five days are added, as with any
other deadline. Lam, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 835, II1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1013(a)
(West Supp. 2003).
141. See Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (1994).
142. The reach of the statute is discussed in Part 11.13 above.
143. See Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 820, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452.
144. Id. The court continued:
We do not believe the Legislature intended that to invoke the special motion to strike the
defendant must first establish its actions are constitutionally protected under the First
Amendment as a matter of law. If this were so the second clause of subdivision (b) [requiring
the court to consider the pleadings and affidavits] of section 425.16 would be superfluous
because by definition the plaintiff could not prevail on its claim.
Id. Accord, e.g., Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 89 Cal. App. 4th 294, 305, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906,
916 (2001).
145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West Supp. 2003)-see supra text accompanying note 86.
146. In Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53, 67, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 518
(2002), the Supreme Court summarized as follows a court's "two-step process" in considering a motion to strike
under section 425.16: "First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the
challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity .... If the court finds such a showing has been
made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim." Id.
"Put another way," said the Supreme Court in a companion case, "the plaintiff must 'demonstrate that the
complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a
favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited."' Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82,
88-89, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 536 (2002) (quoting Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th 811, 821,
123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 26 (2002)). Accord, Rivero v. Am. Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees, 105 Cal.
App. 4th 913, 919, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81, 85 (2003) (quoting passage).
Under the statutory scheme, a motion to strike cannot be successful unless the plaintiff's action is a
meritless attempt to interfere with the defendant's exercise of petition activity and it is shown it lacks
merit. Thus section 425.16 protects the defendant from retaliatory action for his or her exercise of
legitimate petition rights but does not unconstitutionally interfere with the plaintiff's own petition
rights.
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important to remember that the two determinations are made separately and
serially. "[W]hether... material in question is privileged or confidential is not
relevant to the threshold issue of whether the SLAPP statute applies to [the]
complaint. ' '
Although the statute only says "probability," the qualifier "reasonable" has
been read in, following the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in College Hospital,
Inc. v. Superior Court.49 "In making its determination," the statute says, "the
court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating
the facts upon which the liability or defense is based."" ° This means a plaintiff
has "to present evidence showing he would establish a prima facie case at
trial.""'5
[I]n order to satisfy its burden under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP
statute, it is not sufficient that plaintiffs' complaint survive a demurrer.
Plaintiffs must also substantiate the legal sufficiency of their claim. It
would defeat the obvious purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute if mere
allegations in an unverified complaint would be sufficient to avoid an
order to strike the complaint. Substantiation requires something more
than that. Once the court determines the first prong of the statute has
been met, a plaintiff must provide the court with sufficient evidence to
Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 648 n.4, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 631 n.4 (1996).
147. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2003). Kathryn W. Tate, California's Anti-
SLAPP Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on Its Operation and Scope, 33 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 801,
864-66 (2000), has as an appendix a "Summary of Circumstances Where SLAPPee Has Met or Not Met the
Special Motion to Strike Burden of Proof." Although the passage of time has left this summary incomplete, it is
still a useful compilation.
148. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 89 Cal. App. 4th 294, 308, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 918
(2001).
149. 8 Cal. 4th 704, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898 (1994). The first case to decide this in the anti-SLAPP context
was Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 15-16, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 355-56 (1995). College
Hospital, Inc. attempted to harmonize various statutes (such as Civil Code section 1714.10 and Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.14), the Supreme Court believing it "unlikely that each subtle difference in phraseology
was intended to establish a completely different legal standard." 8 Cal. 4th at 716, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905. "As
one of the statutes cited was section 425.16," said the court of appeal in Ludwig, "we must construe it in
accordance with the Supreme Court's analysis." 37 Cal. App. 4th at 16, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356. The word
"probability" was itself a legislative compromise, the original phrase having been "substantial probability." See
discussion in Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 654 n. 10, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 636
n.10 (1996).
150. § 425.16(b)(2). Subsection (b)(3) provides that
[ilf the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will
prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall be
admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, and no burden of proof or degree of
proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determination.
§ 425.16(b)(3).
151. Evans v. Unkow, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1496, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 627-28 (1995).
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permit the court to determine whether "there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim."' 52
In Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, the court stated the now commonly
accepted approach to this showing.
It is recognized, with the requirement that the court consider the
pleadings and affidavits of the parties, the test is similar to the standard
applied to evidentiary showings in summary judgment motions pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c and requires that the showing be
made by competent admissible evidence within the personal knowledge
of the declarant.
53
As on summary judgment, "'to preserve the plaintiffs right to a jury trial the
court's determination of the motion cannot involve a weighing of the evidence.""
Averments on information and belief may not be considered.'55
The difference between a motion for nonsuit and a motion to strike under
section 425.16 is that on a motion for nonsuit the court ignores conflicting
evidence while on a motion under section 425.16 "the court shall consider
152. DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 568, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 760
(2000) (quoting § 425.16(b)(l)).
153. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 654, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 635
(1996). "Put another way, the anti-SLAPP statute require[s] [plaintiff] to 'make a prima facie showing of facts
which would, if proved at trial, support a judgment in plaintiff's favor."' Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 97
Cal. App. 4th 227, 238, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 320 (2002) (quoting Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 646, 49
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631).
"It is recognized" that a SLAPP suit motion to strike "require[s] that the court consider the
pleadings and affidavits of the parties," and therefore that "the test is similar to the standard
applied to evidentiary showings in summary judgment motions .. " Thus, the denial of a
SLAPP suit motion to strike parallels the denial of a motion for summary judgment.
Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 87 Cal. App. 4th 1337, 1348, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 493 (2001). In
Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th 811, 820, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 26 (2002), the Supreme Court
held that where an anti-SLAPP motion is denied because it lacks the required probability of success, this can be
used to establish probable cause in a later malicious prosecution action.
154. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheinm, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635 (quoting
Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 823, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 454 (1994)). Accord, e.g,. Kyle v.
Carmon, 71 Cal. App. 4th 901, 907-08, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 307 (1999) (quoting case).
155. See Evans . Unkow, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624 (1995). The court of appeal relied
on College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 4th 704, 714-17, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898, 904-05 (1994), where
the Supreme Court interpreted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13. See discussion note 149 and
accompanying text. Section 425.13 requires a plaintiff demanding punitive damages from a health care provider
to "set forth competent admissible evidence within the personal knowledge of the declarant." Coll. Hospital,
Inc., 8 Cal. 4th at 720, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903 (emphasis added). The Evans court held that "[I]f an averment on
information and belief is inadequate under... section 425.13, it must likewise be inadequate under section
425.16, for the two statutes are substantially similar." Evans, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 1498, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629.
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the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon
which the liability or defense is based." '56
Even though a decision on probability of success is necessary for both
determinations, a decision on granting a preliminary injunction is not resjudicata
for a motion to strike, because there are other elements (for example balance of
harms) in the injunctive calculus."' The Supreme Court has now held that in a
subsequent malicious prosecution action, "denial of the motion to strike does
establish the existence of probable cause where ... the trial court's denial ruling
was predicated on a finding that the action had potential merit."'58
Where the free speech or petitioning aspect of the defendant's actions is
undeniable, the first prong of the anti-SLAPP test is often conceded, leaving the
motion to be decided on whether the plaintiff has a reasonable probability of
success.'59 This in turn means that the matter will turn on points of substantive
law, or a relatively undeveloped evidentiary record, unrelated to the anti-SLAPP
law itself."
156. Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 828, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 457 (quoting § 425.16(b)) (citations omitted).
Unlike demurrers or motions to strike, which are designed to eliminate sham or facially
meritless allegations, at the pleading stage a SLAPP motion, like a summary judgment
motion, pierces the pleadings and requires an evidentiary showing. As we observed in Kyle v.
Carmon (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 901, [907-08,] [84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303], [307,1 the test applied
to a SLAPP motion is similar to that of a motion for summary judgment, nonsuit, or directed
verdict. Evidence is considered, but not weighed. If the initial evidentiary burden is met by
the moving party, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to avoid dismissal of the
action.
Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 400 (2001).
157. See Lam v. Ngo, 91 Cal. App. 4th 832, 836, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 585 (2001). Additionally, the
court noted,
a key difference between preliminary injunctions and special motions to strike is the role of
the individual cause of action. A single cause of action can sustain a preliminary injunction.
By contrast, an anti-SLAPP suit motion involves examination of each of the causes of action
attacked, because the purpose is to weed out meritless "claims" at an early stage.
Id. at 844, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 591 (citations omitted).
158. Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th at 815, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21.
159. The exemptions provided in the new section 425.17 will, when they become effective in January
2004, provide another way to avoid the statute. See supra note 9.
160. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Irvine City Council, 97 Cal. App. 4th 174, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330 (2002)
(whether a city program was supported by an unlawful expenditure of public funds); Seelig v. Infinity Broad.
Corp., 97 Cal. App. 4th 798, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108 (2002) (whether terms "chicken butt" and "skank" were
actionable). Examples could be multiplied-whether a statement is defamatory, and what standard is to be
applied to a quasi-public figure, are frequent determinants in SLAPP motions. See, e.g., Conroy v. Spitzer, 70
Cal. App. 4th 1446, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (1999).
2003 / California's Anti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven Years
Once a complaint has been stricken, it may not ordinarily be amended."'
Allowing a SLAPP plaintiff leave to amend the complaint once the court
finds the prima facie showing has been met would completely undermine
the statute by providing the pleader a ready escape from section 425.16's
quick dismissal remedy. Instead of having to show a probability of
success on the merits, the SLAPP plaintiff would be able to go back to
the drawing board with a second opportunity to disguise the vexatious
nature of the suit through more artful pleading. This would trigger a
second round of pleadings, a fresh motion to strike, and inevitably
another request for leave to amend.
By the time the moving party would be able to dig out of this procedural
quagmire, the SLAPP plaintiff will have succeeded in his goal of delay
and distraction and running up the costs of his opponent. Such a plaintiff
would accomplish indirectly what could not be accomplished directly,
i.e., depleting the defendant's energy and draining his or her resources.
This would totally frustrate the Legislature's objective of providing a
quick and inexpensive method of unmasking and dismissing such suits. '
As another recent case noted, "the anti-SLAPP statute allows a motion to
strike to be made against only a cause of action, not a cause of action as it applies
to an individual plaintiff."' 63 Therefore if a cause of action is valid as to some
plaintiffs in an action, for anti-SLAPP purposes it is deemed sound as to all
plaintiffs.' 64 Moreover, "Section 425.16 requires separate consideration of each
cause of action, but the special motion to strike may not parse any finer. Unlike
161. See Simmons, 92 Cal. App. 4th at 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401.
[P]ermitting plaintiffs to remove their complaints from the scope of section 425.16 by
withdrawing allegations in the face of an anti-SLAPP motion would be inconsistent with the
decision in Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. that leave to amend to delete allegations from a
complaint may not be granted "once the court finds the requisite connection to First
Amendment speech." (Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1073, [112 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 397]; see also Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n. (2003) 105 Cal. App. 4th
604, 612-613, [129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546] [same rule when appeal taken from denial of motion to
strike].).
Kids Against Pollution v. Cal. Dental Ass'n, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 373, 383 (2003) (final two alterations in
original), review granted and opinion superseded by No. S117156, 2003 WL 22232740, at *1 (Cal. Sept. 17,
2003).
162. Simmons, 92 Cal. App. 4th at 1073-74, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401 (citations omitted). Accord Roberts
v. Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, 105 Cal. App. 4th 604, 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 551 (2003) (quoting
passage, and adding: "There would be little benefit in a right to appeal if the plaintiff could get around appellate
review by filing an amended pleading. Nor would a competitive rush to the courthouse fulfill the Legislative
purpose of a quick and inexpensive method of unmasking and dismissing SLAPP suits.").
163. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 623, 627-28, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 508 (2001).
164. See id.
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conventional motions to strike under sections 435 and 436, the court has no
authority under section 425.16 to strike particular allegations."' 65
The 1999 statutory amendment made a grant or denial of a motion to strike
an appealable order under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1. 66 The same
result is reached in federal court by way of the collateral order doctrine.'67 But
such an appeal "does not automatically stay enforcement of the judgment,"
including the fee award if any, and "to stay enforcement of such a judgment, the
SLAPP plaintiff must give an appropriate appeal bond or undertaking under the
money judgment exception to the automatic stay rule."' 68 On appeal, "[w]hether
section 425.16 applies and whether the plaintiff has shown a probability of
prevailing are both reviewed independently.. .."'69
165. Kids Against Pollution, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381 (citations omitted) review granted and opinion
superseded by No. S 117156, 2003 WL 22232740, at * 1, (Cal. Sept. 17, 2003).
166. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.160) (West Supp. 2003) (added by Act of Oct. 10, 1999, ch. 960,
section 1):
So solicitous is California law of free speech that orders on SLAPP-suit motions under
section 425.16 are immediately appealable. (See § 425.16, subd. (j).) Compare that with
denials of summary judgment motions, where a litigant may only file a writ petition if he or
she wants an immediate review of a possibly erroneous trial court ruling denying the motion.
(See § 437c, subd. (1).)
Lam v. Ngo, 91 Cal. App. 4th 832, 839 n.4, Ill Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 588 n.4 (2001). See also section 425.17(e),
providing that the immediate appeal provision does not apply where a motion to strike is denied because an
action is exempt under newly passed section 425.17. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17(e) (effective Jan. 1,
2004).
167. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2003):
In California state court, a denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is immediately appealable. See
§ 425.16(j). The issue before us as a federal court is whether a district court's denial of an
anti-SLAPP motion is an immediately appealable "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, so
that we have jurisdiction to address Cremers' appeal. We conclude that we have jurisdiction
to review the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to the collateral order doctrine....
The collateral order doctrine establishes a "narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the
litigation, but must, in the interest of achieving a healthy legal system nonetheless be treated
as final. [Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867, 114 S.Ct. 1992,
1995 (1994)] ... To fall into this narrow class of immediately appealable orders, a district
court decision must (I) be "conclusive," (2) "resolve important questions completely separate
from the merits," and (3) "render such questions effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment in the underlying action."
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1024-25 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 867, 114 S.Ct. at 1995-96).
168. Dowling v. Zimmerman, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1400, 1405-06, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 180 (2001). The
money judgment exception is codified at Code of Civil Procedure section 917. 1(a), which provides in pertinent
part: "Unless an undertaking is given, the perfecting of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of the judgment or
order in the trial court if the judgment or order is for any of the following: (1) Money or the payment of
money..." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 917.1(a) (West Supp. 2003). A proposal before the Legislature in its
2002-2003 session would have provided for a stay pending appeal. See text at infra note 303 and accompanying
text.
169. ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 999, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 632 (2001).
See also Mattel, Inc. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1189-90, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d
794, 801 (2002) (applying automatic stay provisions of CCP section 916 to an appeal after denial of an anti-
SLAPP motion to strike).
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In federal court, challenges to the complaint (including those under
section425.16) may be made serially.7° In Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA,1 7 1 a
district court held that "[i]f Plaintiff's complaint survives Rule 9(b) and Rule 12(b)(6)
challenges, the Court will consider Defendants' Motions to Strike.
172
D. Discovery
Subsection (g) of the statute provides:
All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon the filing of
a notice of motion made pursuant to this section. The stay of discovery
shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the
motion. The court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may
order that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this
subdivision. 173
Although this means discovery is discretionary with the court, an early case
has influenced the prevailing view of when discovery should properly be
permitted. In Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co.,' 74 the court
recognized the discovery stay and 30-day hearing requirement of section
425.16, if literally applied in all cases, could adversely affect a plaintiff's
due process rights by placing the burden on the plaintiff to show a prima
facie case without permitting the collection of evidence needed to satisfy
that burden, particularly where the principal source of evidence critical to
establishing the prima facie case is in the possession of the defendant and
not available from other sources. Accordingly, the Lafayette court
stated ... that "[I]f the plaintiff makes a timely and proper showing in
response to the motion to strike[] that a defendant or witness possesses
evidence needed by plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff
must be given the reasonable opportunity to obtain that evidence through
discovery before the motion to strike is adjudicated. The trial court,
therefore, must liberally exercise its discretion by authorizing reasonable
and specified discovery timely petitioned for by a plaintiff .... when
evidence to establish a prima facie case is reasonably shown to be held,
or known, by defendant or its agents and employees." We may not
170. For a discussion of section 425.16 in federal court, see Part III below.
171. No. Civ. 00CVI839B (CGA), 2001 WL 29033 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2001), rev'd in part on other
grounds 317 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003).
172. Vess, 2001 WL 290333, at *3.
173. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 425.16(g) (West Supp. 2003).
174. 37 Cal. App. 4th 855,868, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 54 (1995).
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disturb the trial court's ruling on such a discovery request absent an
abuse of discretion....
But unless there is a showing that the matter proposed to be discovered will
bear materially on the prima facie showing the plaintiff must make to avoid a
strike order, a court is justified in denying the request and stay.1
76
The situation is otherwise in federal court, where under Rogers v. Home
Shopping Network, Inc., "if a plaintiff requires discovery to oppose a motion
brought under § 425.16, the hearing on the motion should be stayed until
discovery is completed."' California appellate courts have been rather strict that
a request for discovery must observe the formalities of a noticed motion.1
E. Attorney Fees
Reflecting the deliberate policy of the Legislature to protect poorer
defendants from attacks by well-funded plaintiffs, the statute provides for
attorney fees for prevailing defendants.
In any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a
special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's
fees and costs. If the court finds that a special motion to strike is
frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall
award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the
motion, pursuant to Section 128.5.179
Accordingly, "any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to
strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees."' But the attorney fee provisions of
the statute are not symmetrical-a defendant "shall" recover fees and costs if it




175. Schroeder v. Irvine City Council, 97 Cal. App. 4th 174, 190-91, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330, 343 (2002)
(quoting Lafayette Morehouse, Inc., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 868, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54) (citations omitted).
176. See id. at 192-93, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344-45.
177. Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1271 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Rogers
v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973, 985 (C.D. Cal. 1999)).
178. See, e.g., Braun v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1052, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 67
(1997) ("failure to comply with subdivision (g) dooms the discovery request"); Evans v. Unkow, 38 Cal. App.
4th 1490, 1499, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 630 (1995) ("failure to comply.., makes.., discovery request
meritless"); Robertson v. Rodriguez, 36 Cal. App. 4th 347, 357, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 469 (1995) (failure to
comply justifies adverse procedural decision).
179. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (West Supp. 2003). The word shall in the second sentence was
changed from may by Cal. Stats. 1993, c. 1239 (SB 9), § 1.
180. Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1131, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 383 (2001). This was only the
second case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the anti-SLAPP law.
181. A defendant making a SLAPP motion and a plaintiff in a civil rights action thus enjoy the same
preference for attorney fees if they are successful. Given this similarity in approach between ...
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The fee-shifting provision was apparently intended to discourage such
strategic lawsuits against public participation by imposing the litigation
costs on the party seeking to "chill the valid exercise of the constitutional
rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances."
The fee-shifting provision also encourages private representation in
SLAPP cases, including situations when a SLAPP defendant is unable to
afford fees or the lack of potential monetary damages precludes a
standard contingency fee arrangement."'
One situation which has received a lot of attention in the appellate courts is
that where a SLAPP plaintiff, about to lose a motion to strike, voluntarily
dismisses the action. Is the SLAPP defendant now a prevailing defendant,
entitled to attorney fees under section 425.16(c), or not? The statute does not
define "prevailing defendant."'83 In Coltrain v. Shewalter, the court held that
where the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an alleged SLAPP suit while a
special motion to strike is pending, the trial court has discretion to
determine whether the defendant is the prevailing party for purposes of
attorney's fees under [§ 425.16(c)]. In making that determination, the
critical issue is which party realized its objectives in the litigation. Since
the defendant's goal is to make the plaintiff go away with its tail between
its legs, ordinarily the prevailing party will be the defendant. The
plaintiff, however, may try to show it actually dismissed because it had
substantially achieved its goals through a settlement or other means,
because the defendant was insolvent, or for other reasons unrelated to the
probability of success on the merits."'
Thus voluntary dismissal erects a presumption that the defendant is the
prevailing party; unless rebutted this presumption permits a fee award."' But
section 425.16, subdivision (c) and [42 U.S.C.] section 1988, authority under section 1988 is
particularly helpful in applying section 425.16, subdivision (c).
ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1018, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 647 (2001).
182. Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1131, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383 (quoting § 425.16(a)) (citation omitted).
183. See, e.g., Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(a)(4), defining "prevailing party" as including "a
defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered" CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1032(a)(4) (West Supp. 2003); see
also CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.85 (West Supp. 2003) (mobilehome residency law): "[a] party shall be deemed a
prevailing party ... where the litigation is dismissed in his or her favor prior to or during the trial, unless the
parties otherwise agree in the settlement or compromise." But see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1717(b)(2) (West
1998) ("[wlhere an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there
shall be no prevailing party .... ; id. § 3176 (West 1993) (same) (action on bonded stop notice).
184. Coltrain v. Shewalter, 66 Cal. App. 4th 94, 107, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 608 (1998).
185. See id. Similar results have been reached in later cases. See, e.g., Kyle v. Carmon, 71 Cal. App. 4th
901, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303 (1999). Kyle also held that a plaintiff may dismiss its action voluntarily after the
motion to strike has been heard, but before it has been ruled on. Id. at 910, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 308. The
adjudication was therefore void, but the court retained jurisdiction to award fees under section 425.16(c). Id. at
908 & n.4, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307 & n.4. Accord eCash Techs., Inc. v. Guagliardo, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1084
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other courts have disagreed. In Liu v. Moore"' the court held that, since "the trial
court's adjudication of the merits of a defendant's motion to strike is an essential
predicate to ruling on the defendant's request for an award of fees and costs,"'87
no fees can be awarded under the statute until a decision has been made on the
SLAPP issue, and so a SLAPP defendant has a right to a merits determination of
this issue despite the dismissal.' As there are no pending legislative proposals to
settle this question, it will be up to the Supreme Court to decide which approach
will prevail.' It seems unnecessary to require adjudication of a motion to strike a
dismissed action if the prevailing party can be identified in a fee hearing.
Other fee issues have been settled more tidily. What is a "reasonable" fee is
within the discretion of the trial court to determine,' 9° and may be less than was
actually paid.' Attorney fees can be awarded for the motion to strike, but not for
the entire action if there are parts unaffected by the motion to strike. 192 But losing
some parts of the action does not defeat the fee entitlement for the motion
attacking those causes of action which were actually stricken under the statute.93
A fee request need not be documented at the time of filing the motion to
strike, and can be made not only in that motion but in a subsequent motion for
fees or in a costs memorandum.' 94 "[A]n award of fees may include not only the
(C.D. Cal. 2000) affid No. 00-57107, 2002 WL 987324, 35 Fed. Appx. 498 (9th Cir. May 13, 2002) (granting
motion to strike would be improper after voluntary dismissal, but merits of motion may still be considered in
proceeding for fees and costs) (citing Kyle).
186. 69 Cal. App. 4th 745, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807 (1999).
187. Id. at 752, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 812.
188. See id. at 754-55, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813.
189. For a full discussion of the case law, see Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Bernard, 101 Cal. App. 4th
211, 216-19, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 647, 651-53 (2002), holding that fees may be awarded to the defendants despite
an involuntary dismissal under the doctrine de minimis non curat lex.
190. See Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 659, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 638
(1996); Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
191. See Robertson v. Rodriguez, 36 Cal. App. 4th 347, 360-62,42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 471-72 (1995).
192. See Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 39 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1381, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 542, 542-43 (1995). This case, dealing with fees, is sometimes called More l (after More University, which
figured largely in the case), to distinguish it from the more substantive leading case More I, meaning Lafayette
Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (1995). In More II the
court based this holding on the legislative history-for example, a Senate Floor Report stating "[t]his
bill ... provides that a prevailing defendant in the motion to strike is entitled to recover his or her attorney's
fees for that motion." More I, 39 Cal. App. 4th at 1383, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 544 (quoting SENATE FLOOR
ANALYSIS OF SB 1264, at I (Apr. 9, 1991).
193. See ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 997-98, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 631
(2001).
194. See Am. Humane Ass'n v. L.A. Times Communications, 92 Cal. App. 4th 1095, 1103, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 488,494 (2001).
There are three ways the special motion to strike attorney fee issue can be raised. The
successful defendant can: make a subsequent noticed motion as was envisioned by defendant
in this case; seek an attorney fee and cost award at the same time as the special motion to
strike is litigated, as is often done; or as part of a cost memorandum. The successful
defendant who specially moves to strike pursuant to section 425.16 has the option of utilizing
a separate noticed attorney fee motion. A trial court cannot deny a section 425.16 attorney fee
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fees incurred with respect to the underlying claim, but also the fees incurred in
enforcing the right to mandatory fees" under the statute.'95 Fees can be awarded
even though the prevailing defendant was not itself liable for them, as in Macias. . 196
v. Hartwell, where the defendant's union paid for his representation. The
Supreme Court has held that the lodestar method for setting fee awards, including
multipliers for various factors including skill, difficulty and contingency, may be
used for awards under section 425.16.9' Attorney fees are available for an appeal
of a motion to strike, and of a fee award.'9g But a party who prevailed below but
is reversed on appeal cannot gain fees, because it "should not have prevailed."' 9
motion because the defendant seeks to litigate that issue in a separate subsequently filed
noticed motion.
Id. (citations omitted).
195. Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1141, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 391 (2001); see Metabolife Int'l,
Inc. v. Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
196. See Macias v. Hartwell, 55 Cal. App. 4th 669, 675-76, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 226 (1997). The court
noted that a contrary rule would block a fee award "if the defense costs were paid by his homeowner's
insurance carrier, the union's insurance carrier, or a relative. No court has so held." Id. at 676, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 226. See also, e.g., Rosenaur v. Scherer, 88 Cal. App. 4th 260, 265, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 674, 678 (2001)
("partial" pro bono representation, waiving payment by client but not by opponent's insurer). In Dowling v.
Zimmerman, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1400, 1405, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 179 (2001), the court held that
in order to effectuate the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute and the Legislature's intent to
deter SLAPP suits, a defendant who appears in a SLAPP action in propria persona and later
retains specially appearing counsel who successfully brings on behalf of the defendant a
special motion to strike the complaint under section 425.16 is entitled to recover an award of
reasonable attorney fees under the mandatory provisions of [subsection (c)] in order to
compensate the retained counsel for the legal services provided in connection with both the
special motion to strike, and the recovery of attorney fees and costs under that subdivision.
Id.
197. See Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384. Even before Ketchum it was considered
proper to consider many aspects of an attorney's performance in awarding a fee under section 425.16
The matter of reasonableness of attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the trial
judge. Determining the weight and credibility of the evidence, especially credibility of
witnesses, is the special province of the trier of fact. In determining what constitutes a
reasonable compensation for an attorney who has rendered services in connection with a legal
proceeding, the court may and should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the
amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the
attention given, the success of the attorney's efforts, his learning, his age, and his experience
in the particular type of work demanded... ; the intricacies and importance of the litigation,
the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time
consumed.
Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 659, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 638-39 (1996)
(citations and quotation apparatus omitted) (quoting Stokus v. Marsh, 217 Cal. App. 3d 647, 656-57, 266 Cal.
Rptr. 90, 96 (1990)).
198. See Evans v. Unkow, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1499-1500, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 630 (1995); accord,
e.g., Wilkerson v. Sullivan, 99 Cal. App. 4th 443, 446, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 277 (2002); Dove Audio, Inc. v.
Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 785, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 835 (1996).
199. Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1368, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 872 (2001).
"Because we have determined defendants should not have prevailed on their motion to strike, it follows that
they are not entitled to the fees and costs the trial court awarded them." Id. See also, e.g., Gallimore v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1401, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 560, 570 (2002) ("In view of our
reversal of that order [to strike], however, the attorney's fee award no longer has a legal basis and must
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In a recent case, the court of appeal held that the cases holding that a court must
determine which party would have prevailed at the trial level (in order to set fees
in a dismissed action) do not apply where it is an appeal that is dismissed before
decision."
In Schroeder v. Irvine City Council2  the City Council won a motion to strike,
and Schroeder argued that when a governmental body was involved the mandatory
fee award provided by section 425.16(c) "impermissibly infringes on the plaintiff's
First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances."' 2 Unless the provision
were read as permissive, Schroeder argued, it would be unconstitutional. The court
was unpersuaded by this or other ingenious attacks on the constitutionality of
applying the mandatory fee provision to governmental entities.2 3
F. Exemption for Enforcement Actions
Subsection (d) of the statute provides that "[t]his section shall not apply to any
enforcement action brought in the name of the people of the State of California by
the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a public
prosecutor. ''2° Only two cases decided so far have construed this provision. In
People v. Health Laboratories of North America, Inc.,2°5 two district attorneys
brought an action on behalf of the People against the makers of a supposed weight
loss product, charging false advertising and unfair business practices.2" The
manufacturers moved to strike the action as a SLAPP. They acknowledged that
section 425.16(d) would exempt the action against them, but attacked the section's
constitutionality, claiming it "arbitrarily discriminated against them and violated their
necessarily fall as well."); Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. v. Pearl St., LLC, 109 Cal. App. 4th 1308, 1320, 135
Cal. Rptr. 2d 903, 911-12 (2003) ("Th[e] statutory basis for the award no longer exists because we have
determined that the Board should have prevailed on the motion to strike. Therefore, it follows that the order
awarding fees and costs cannot stand.").
200. A plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of an appeal from an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion (and
awarding attorney fees) stands on different footing than the voluntary dismissal of an action with
an anti-SLAPP motion pending. In the former circumstance, the trial court has ruled on the motion
to strike on the merits and concluded that the action was a SLAPP suit, thus entitling the defendant
to recover attorney fees in connection with the motion. The dismissal of an appeal from the trial
court's determination leaves intact the judicial finding that the action was a SLAPP suit, which in
turn entitles the defendant to recover fees under section 425.16.
Wilkerson v. Sullivan, 99 Cal. App. 4th 443, 447, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 278 (2002). The court continued: "We
discern no reason for denying a recovery of attorney fees and costs on appeal simply because the plaintiff
decides not to pursue the appeal to final determination." Id. at 448, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 278-79.
201. 97 Cal. App. 4th 174, 193, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330, 345 (2002).
202. Id.
203. See id. at 193-96, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 345-48. In 1999, Senator Ray Haynes (R., Riverside/San
Diego Counties) introduced a bill (SB 1188) which would have deprived public entities, or public officers
acting in their official capacities, of the right to bring anti-SLAPP motions at all. The bill had no success in the
Legislature.
204. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(d) (West Supp. 2003).
205. 87 Cal. App. 4th 442, 445, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 618, 620 (2001).
206. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500, 17508 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
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right to equal protection of the law because private plaintiffs who sue a defendant for
conduct which is in furtherance of the defendant's free speech rights are subject to
the anti-SLAPP statute but public prosecutors are not." 2°7 The court held the
exemption constitutional.09 First, the statutory history supported the view that the
exemption was not arbitrary, but a deliberate response to concerns raised in the
legislative process.2°9 Second, the exemption affected speech only tangentially, so the
court applied a rational basis test rather than strict scrutiny.2'° And finally, the
classification did bear a rational relation to legitimate state objectives, and was
justified on practical grounds.
In the second case, City of Long Beach v. California Citizens for Neighborhood
Empowerment,212 decided in August 2003, the court of appeal decided against a
literal interpretation of the exemption. Again relying on legislative history, the court
held that to be covered an action did not need actually to be brought "in the name of
the people of the State of California," but that an action brought by a city attorney
11 213"aimed at consumer and/or public protection" would qualify for the exemption.
The exemption for enforcement actions was significantly enlarged on September
6, 2003, when Governor Davis signed S.B. 515, creating a new section 425.17. This
section
provide[d] that certain actions are not subject to a special motion to strike, as
specified, including, but not limited to, any action brought solely in the
public interest or on behalf of the general public, if specified conditions
exist. The bill.., further provide[d] that related appeal provisions are not
207. 87 Cal. App. 4th at 445, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620.
208. Id. at 951, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 624. Earlier attacks on the constitutionality of the anti-SLAPP law,
on other grounds, were rejected when courts of appeal upheld the statute in Dixon v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.
App. 4th 733, 746, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 696-97 (1994) and Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing
Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, 865-66, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 52 (1995). In Shalaby v. Jacobowitz, No. C 03-0227-
CRB, 2003 WL 1907664 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2003), the court rejected for lack of standing some rather muddy
challenges to the statute's constitutionality. A later constitutional challenge to the anti-SLAPP law, by the same
plaintiff against Attorney General Lockyer, was dismissed under Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Shalaby
v. California, 2003 WL 21556930 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2003).
209. See 87 Cal. App. 4th at 446-47, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621. The court pointed out that in 1990
Governor Deukmejian vetoed a bill (SB 2313) (1990) without the exemption. But in 1991 Governor Wilson
vetoed one (SB 10) (1991) which had been amended to include the exemption, which makes it a wash. Id.
Nevertheless this history does show that the question was considered and deliberately decided.
210. See id. at 448-49, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622.
211. See id. at 447-51, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621-24.
212. 111 Cal. App. 4th 302, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473 (2003).
213. Id. at 308, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 478. The court also rejected a similarly literal argument that the phrase
"acting as a public prosecutor" meant the exemption applied only in criminal cases. See id. at 306, 3 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 476.
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applicable to these actions. The bill ... also provide[d] that its provisions are
severable, and would make specified findings and declarations." 4
The "specified conditions" exempting an action from the anti-SLAPP remedy
are:
(1) The plaintiff does not seek any relief greater than or different from
the relief sought for the general public or a class of which the plaintiff is
a member. A claim for attorney's fees, costs, or penalties does not
constitute greater or different relief for purposes of this subdivision.
(2) The action, if successful, would enforce an important right affecting
the public interest, and would confer a significant benefit, whether
pecuniary or nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large class of
persons.
(3) Private enforcement is necessary and places a disproportionate
financial burden on the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiffs stake in the
215matter.
Also exempted from an anti-SLAPP motion to strike are actions against
a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or
services, including, but not limited to, insurance, securities, or financial
instruments, arising from any statement or conduct by that person if both
of the following conditions exist:
(1) The statement or conduct consists of representations of fact about that
person's or a business competitor's business operations, goods, or services,
that is made for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or
securing sales or leases of, or commercial transactions in, the person's goods
or services, or the statement or conduct was made in the course of delivering
the person's goods or services.
(2) The intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer, or
a person likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, an
actual or potential buyer or customer, or the statement or conduct arose
out of or within the context of a regulatory approval process, proceeding,
or investigation, except where the statement or conduct was made by a
telephone corporation in the course of a proceeding before the California
Public Utilities Commission and is the subject of a lawsuit brought by a
214. Statement of the Legislative Analyst accompanying S.B. 515 (Feb. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0501-0550/sb_515_bill_20030220_introduced.html (last visited Nov.
12, 2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
215. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2004).
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competitor, notwithstanding that the conduct or statement concerns an
216important public issue .
But exempted from the exemption are actions brought against
(1) Any person enumerated in subdivision (b) of Section 2 of Article I of
the California Constitution or Section 1070 of the Evidence Code, or any
person engaged in the dissemination of ideas or expression in any book
or academic journal, while engaged in the gathering, receiving, or
processing of information for communication to the public.
(2) Any action against any person or entity based upon the creation,
dissemination, exhibition, advertisement, or other similar promotion of
any dramatic, literary, musical, political, or artistic work, including, but
not limited to, a motion picture or television program, or an article
published in a newspaper or magazine of general circulation.
(3) Any nonprofit organization that receives more than 50 percent of its
annual revenues from federal, state, or local government grants, awards,
programs, or reimbursements for services rendered.2 7
These persons will still be permitted to use the motion to strike. The new
measure does not take effect until January 1, 2004, so no case law is yet
available. It seems certain to prompt clarifying litigation in the coming years.
2 18
III. SECTION 425.16 IN FEDERAL COURT
In United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,"' the
Ninth Circuit decided that California's anti-SLAPP remedy applies to diversity
actions in federal court. The court of appeals reversed on this point a decision of
the Northern District of California, and held that section 425.16 did not conflict
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but could "exist side by side.., each
controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.",
22
1
216. Id. § 425.17(c) (effective Jan. 1, 2004).
217. Id. § 425.17(d) (effective Jan. 1, 2004).
218. A similar proposal had passed the preceding year as S.B. 789, but Governor Davis vetoed it. His veto
message can be found at http://www.govemor.ca.gov/govsite/msdocs/press-release/L02-250_SB_789_veto_
message.doc.
219. 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999).
220. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., No. C88-20009 JW, 1995 WL 470218 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 1995).
221. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d at 972 (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740,
752, 100 S.Ct. 1978, 1986 (1980). The rules section 425.16 was said to have conflicted with were "Rule 8
(requiring specificity in pleadings), Rule 12(f) (motions to strike), Rule 12(b)(6) (motions to dismiss for failure
to state a claim), and Rule 56 (motions for summary judgment)." Id. The court considered only the motion to
strike and the fee provision. Id. at 972 & n. 11. Other topics such as the discovery stay were left for a later day.
Id.
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A qui tam plaintiff, for example, after being served in federal court with
counterclaims like those brought by [Lockheed], may bring a special
motion to strike pursuant to [section] 425.16(b). If successful, the litigant
may be entitled to fees pursuant to [section] 425.16(c). If unsuccessful,
the litigant remains free to bring a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, or a Rule
56 motion for summary judgment. We fail to see how the prior
application of the anti-SLAPP provisions will directly interfere with the
operation of Rule 8, 12, or 56. In summary, there is no "direct collision"
here.222
As there was no "direct collision" with the Federal Rules, the court was left with
a "typical, relatively unguided Erie choice., 223 The parties did not identify "any
federal interests that would be undermined by application of the anti-SLAPP
provisions, ''224but "California has articulated ... important, substantive state interests
furthered by the Anti-SLAPP statute.' '221 Moreover, as the California procedure offers
mandatory fee awards,
if the anti-SLAPP provisions are held not to apply in federal court, a
litigant interested in bringing meritless SLAPP claims would have a
significant incentive to shop for a federal forum. Conversely, a litigant
otherwise entitled to the protections of the Anti-SLAPP statute would
find considerable disadvantage in a federal proceeding. This outcome
221appears to run squarely against the "twin aims" of the Erie doctrine.
Once it was settled that section 425.16 applied in diversity actions, litigants
in California federal courts started making anti-SLAPP motions with some
frequency. One of the first issues to be decided (in Rogers v. Home Shopping
Network, Inc.)'27 was that, while the motion to strike was available in federal
court, the interplay between subsections (f) and (g) of the California law, which
"allows the defendant served with a complaint to immediately put the plaintiff to
his or her proof before the plaintiff can conduct discovery," 28 did conflict with
federal procedure.229 The court cited a number of California cases where the
222. Id. at 972.
223. Id. (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 1144 (1965) and 19 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4511 (2d ed.
1996)). The "Erie choice" refers, of course, to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938).
224. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d at 973.
225. Id.
226. Id. The "twin aims" are "discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws." Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468, 85 S.Ct. at 1142.
227. 57 F. Supp. 2d 973 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
228. hi. at 980.
229. Id. at 983. Section 425.16 "sets out a mere rule of procedure .. " Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37
Cal. App. 4th 8, 21, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 360 (1995) (quoted in Rogers, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 977). The Ludwig
court continued: "but it is founded in constitutional doctrine. 'Those who petition the government are generally
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plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, but where motions to
strike were granted because the plaintiffs could not support their claims with
adequate evidence.3 "Thus, a special motion to strike can be used as a summary
,,211judgment motion. Considering the two provisions as summary judgment rules,
[section] 425.16 and Rule 56(f) have different objectives. Section 425.16
was designed to allow a party defending a SLAPP action to resolve the
matter as early as possible, before extensive discovery is permitted. Rule
56(f), however, was designed to ensure that a nonmoving party will not
be forced to defend a summary judgment motion without having an
opportunity to marshal supporting evidence. These divergent goals can
produce directly conflicting outcomes.232
To avoid a collision between the two rules, the court held that
if a defendant [in a federal action] desires to make a special motion to
strike based on the plaintiffs lack of evidence, the defendant may not do
so until discovery has been developed sufficiently to permit summary
judgment under Rule 56. Once the nonmoving party has been given the
opportunity to conduct discovery, the special motion can be heard and
attorney's fees will be available as provided in § 425.16(c). 33
The next federal case decided a point equally important for federal practice
under the statute: the availability of the anti-SLAPP remedy depends on the
source of federal jurisdiction. The Lockheed case involved state law claims,
prosecuted in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. In Globetrotter Software,
234Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., Judge Fogel held that federal question claims
are not subject to the remedy, even if pendent state claims in the same action are
subject to it.
235
immune from ... liability."' Id. (quoting Prof'l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures, Indus., Inc., 508
U.S. 49, 56, 112 S.Ct. 1920, 1926 (1993)).
230. See Rogers, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 980-81. The cases the court cited included Beilenson v. Superior
Court, 44 Cal. App. 4th 944, 950-52, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 362-63 (1996), Church of Scientology v.
Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 655, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 636 (1996), Matson v. Dvorak, 40 Cal. App. 4th
539, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 886-87 (1995), and Robertson v. Rodriguez, 36 Cal. App. 4th 347, 356-57, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 464,469-70 (1995).
231. Rogers, 57F. Supp. 2dat981.
232. Id. at 981-82.
233. id. at 982. The Ninth Circuit, in its second substantive published decision on section 425.16, agreed
with the court's reasoning and adopted its rule. See Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th
Cir. 2001). Judge Rymer dissented. See 264 F.3d at 850 (Rymer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234. 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
235. Id. at 1129-30.
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IV. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
A. In the Courts
Even after eleven years not every question about California's anti-SLAPP
law has been decided, nor has every desirable improvement been made. The
Supreme Court decided four SLAPP cases in August 2002,21' remarkable as the
court had decided only two SLAPP cases in all of the previous decade.117 As
noted, the Equilon and Cashman cases decided one of the main issues still
outstanding in SLAPP litigation-whether a SLAPP defendant need show a
chilling effect or an intent to chill First Amendment rights. This clarified the law
significantly, as this question affected every anti-SLAPP filing no matter what its
procedural posture.
But other questions remain unsettled. One important surviving area of
uncertainty concerns discovery. As noted, since its passage in 1992 section
425.16(g) has imposed a stay of discovery during the pendency of a motion to
strike, provided that "[t]he court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown,
may order that specified discovery be conducted.... "' A useful dictum in
Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. states that a timely
showing by the plaintiff that evidence needed to establish a prima facie case is
under the control of the defendant warrants permitting discovery .2 9 But beyond
that there is little in the case law to guide the court in its exercise of discretion.
Supreme Court attention to this topic is long overdue.
Bench and bar could also benefit from Supreme Court review of other more
specialized issues.
Severable and "mixed" causes of action. Disharmonious (if not quite
conflicting) decisions obscure the question of how to deal with a complaint
where some causes of action are subject to a motion to strike and others are not.
"[I]n M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc.,' 24° the
court held that, where the plaintiffs had shown a probability of prevailing
on some of their causes of action, the action as a whole could not be said
to be without merit. Therefore it was unnecessary to consider whether the
236. Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th 811, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19 (2002), Equilon
Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (2002), City of Cotati v.
Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th 69, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 519 (2002), and Nevellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 124 Cal. Rptr.
2d 530 (2002).
237. Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471 (1999);
Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (2001). Although other Supreme Court cases
mentioned the statute, they did so only tangentially.
238. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (West Supp. 2003). As noted above, supra note 177, the
situation is different in federal court. See, e.g., Rogers v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973,
985 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
239. 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, 868, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 54 (1995).
240. 89 Cal. App. 4th 623, 637, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 515 (2001).
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plaintiffs had shown they probably would prevail on the remaining
causes of action. Instead, all of the causes of action should survive the
defendants' SLAPP motion. 4'
But n Sekher . Fnancal ndenit ""242
But in Shekhter v. Financial Indemnity Co., the court held the statute "allows
a single cause of action to be stricken. The fact that other claims remain does not
bar a trial judge from granting a section 425.16 special motion to strike." 243 This
seems the better view.24 Also, in ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson,245 the court
suggested the difference was that in M.G. the claims subject to strike were
"factually or legally intertwined." ' Is that the proper test? Moreover, in Kids
Against Pollution v. California Dental Ass 'n, the court decided that where a single
cause of action alleges both protected and unprotected speech, it should be treated
as protected if the protected expression forms a "significant part" of the cause of
action.' 4' And in Finke v. Walt Disney Co. the court held that "a defendant may
move to strike a cause of action under section 425.16 if at least one of the predicate
acts was an act in furtherance of the defendant's right to petition or free speech in
connection with a public issue." '  These holdings seem correct, but the rationales
have become tangled, and it would help to have the Supreme Court clarify the law.
Newspaper as public forum. To what extent is a newspaper ipso facto a
"public forum" for anti-SLAPP purposes? It has been said that the statute was
241. ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1004, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 636 (2001)
(characterizing M.G.).
242. 89 Cal. App. 4th 141, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (2001).
243. Id. at 150, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849.
244. [T]he fact the court cannot strike particular allegations from the cause of action logically leads to
the conclusion the cause of action must be subjected to SLAPP scrutiny if any of the allegations of
conduct giving rise to liability involve conduct in furtherance of the defendant's rights of petition
or free speech on a public issue.
Finke v. Walt Disney Co., 110 Cal. App. 4th 1210, 1224, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 448 (2003) (footnote omitted).
245. 93 Cal. App. 4th at 1004, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
246. The court said:
Under those circumstances, it can be said that, if one cause of action survives a SLAPP
motion, the rest should too, because the causes of action are factually and legally intertwined.
And because the causes of action are so closely related, even "cumulative," a probability of
prevailing on one claim shows the rest of the claims are not without merit.
Here, however, the claims are not factually or legally intertwined.
Id.
247. Kids Against Pollution v. Cal. Dental Ass'n, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 373 (2003) review granted and
opinion superseded by No. S 117156, 2003 WL 22232740, at *1 (Cal. Sept. 17, 2003).This case built on a
similar holding in Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 89 Cal. App. 4th 294, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906
(2001), and was explicitly followed in Finke v. Walt Disney Co., 110 Cal. App. 4th 1210, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436
(2003). In Finke the court reaffirmed the holding of Fox that "a plaintiff cannot frustrate the purposes of the
SLAPP statute through a pleading tactic of combining allegations of protected and nonprotected activity under
the label of one 'cause of action."' 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1218, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 443 (quoting. Fox, 89 Cal. App.
4th at 308, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 918).
248. 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1227, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 456.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 34
intended to cover newspaper reporting generally,2 4 and a newspaper even of very
limited circulation may be a public forum,2 but newspapers in general have not
been explicitly held to be so, 2 ' and indeed have explicitly been held not to be
252 25so. Certainly a newspaper's reporting of public affairs is free speech. ' But
dicta in the case law leave the broader issue uncertain. The Supreme Court
should clarify that a newspaper is a public forum, at least for anti-SLAPP
255
purposes.
Advertising. The courts of appeal have been inconsistent on the extent to which
section 425.16 applies to advertising and statements about commercial products. For
example, in DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court25 6 statements about
249. See Michael D. Stokes, SLAPPing Down the Right to Trial by Jury: The SLAPP Legislation
Confusion of 1992, 14 Civ. LITIG. REP. 485, 487 (1992). Stokes participated in drafting the 1992 legislation,
and his views in this article, drawn from his experience, have been cited by several courts-see Wilcox v.
Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 820, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 452 (1994); Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v.
Chronicle Publ'g Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, 863-64, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 51 (1995) ("the language of the statute
was broad enough to cover news reporting activity and that newspapers and publishers, who regularly face libel
litigation, would be one of the 'prime beneficiaries' of section 425.16." (citing Stokes, supra)).
250. A good example is the housing development residents' newsletter in Damon v. Ocean Hills
Journalism Club, 85 Cal. App. 4th 468, 476, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 210 (2000): "The stated purpose of the
Village Voice newsletter was to 'communicate information of interest and/or concern to the residents.' The
newsletter was distributed to the approximately 3,000 Ocean Hills residents and neighboring businesses." The
court declared that even if it were true that the paper was "essentially a mouthpiece for a small group of
homeowners who generally would not permit contrary viewpoints to be published," id., it would still be a public
forum. Id. See also, e.g., Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1165 (S.D. Cal. 1999) ("a
widely disseminated television broadcast.., is undoubtedly a public forum"); Sipple v. Found. for Nat'l
Progress, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226, 238, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 684 (1999) (Mother Jones magazine).
251. See, e.g., Lafayette Morehouse ("More r"), 37 Cal. App. 4th at 863 n.5, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51 n.5,
where the court specifically declined to rule on this question and said: "We find this ... rationale.., somewhat
dubious. No authorities have been cited to us holding a newspaper printing allegedly libelous material is a
'place open to the public or a public forum."' Accord Rogers v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d
973, 985 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("newspaper should not be deemed a 'public forum' for purposes of § 425.16")
(citing More I). Nevertheless More I held the news reporting at issue in the case to be covered by the statute.
Lafayette Morehouse, Inc., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 863-64, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51.
252. See Weinberg v. Feisel, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1122, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 391 (2003): "Means of
communication where access is selective, such as most newspapers, newsletters, and other media outlets, are
not public forums." (citing Ark. Educ. TV v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678-680 (1998)); see also Condit v. Nat'l
Enquirer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953 (E.D. Cal. 2002): "A newspaper should not be deemed a 'public forum;
for purposes of § 425.16."
253. See Lafayette Morehouse, Inc., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 864, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51; Braun v. Chronicle
Publ'g Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1045, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 62 (1997).
254. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
255. At least a newspaper of general circulation. In Weinberg v. Feisel, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1122, 1131
n.4, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 391 n.4 (2003), the court stated:
Those cases establish beyond doubt that a private, selective-access newsletter is the very
antithesis of a public forum. While it might be shown in a particular case that a newsletter is
sufficiently open to general public access as to come within section 425.16, a private,
selective-access newsletter cannot be found to be a public forum without such a showing. To
the extent the decision in Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, suggests otherwise, it is
contrary to the plain language of the statute, and we decline to follow it.
This identified conflict only underscores the need for authoritative resolution of the question.
256. 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 567, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 759 (2000).
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Coumadin were held protected because they concerned a matter of public interest,
but in Consumer Justice Center v. Trimedica International, Inc. 7 statements about
Grobust were held not protected.2 8 In Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc.259 the court
held labeling and website claims unprotected as commercial speech, based in part on
Kasky v. Nike, Inc.,26 but left undecided the application of the commercial speech
exception to more substantive speech. Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has
211postponed indefinitely its consideration of this issue in the Kasky case, there is no
reason for the California Supreme Court to delay any further an authoritative
resolution of this question as it affects the reach of the anti-SLAPP law.262
Quasi-governmental bodies. In Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club... the
court of appeal made the remarkable statement that "[a] homeowners association
board is in effect 'a quasi-government entity paralleling in almost every case the
powers, duties, and responsibilities of a municipal government,"' and so
proceedings before it are covered by section 425.16.264 Is this really the law? An
earlier case had extended anti-SLAPP coverage only on the basis that statements
made in an association meeting "involved matters of sufficient public interest
made in a sufficiently public forum to invoke the protection of section 425.16.265
It is quite a step from that to recognizing a parallel "quasi-government." Another
way to put the question is: when section 425.16(e)(1) and (2) speak of
"legislative, executive, or judicial" proceedings or consideration or review by
such a "body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,"266 must any
such proceeding or body be authorized "by law" to qualify for anti-SLAPP
coverage, or can informal "amateur" bodies (and their proceedings) really qualify
also? And if so, how can we tell a quasi-government from a social club or a
business? Does the constitutional right of petition (which specifically refers to
government)' 67 truly extend to such bodies? If the Supreme Court authoritatively
expands the reach of the statute to cover private associations, the scope of anti-
SLAPP litigation will inevitably expand with it.
257. 107 Cal. App. 4th 595, 601, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 191, 194 (2003).
258. See also cases mentioned supra note 61.
259. 109 Cal. App. 4th 39, 48-49 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 420, 426-27 (2003).
260. 27 Cal. 4th 939, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 (2002).
261. See 123 S.Ct. 2554, 2554 (2003), dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted. The case has since
been settled. See, e.g., William McCall, Nike Free-Speech Case Settled for $1.5 Million, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept.
13, 2003.
262. For a discussion of some of the open issues in commercial speech, see Amber McGovern, Kasky v.
Nike, Inc.: A Reconsideration of the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. &
POL'Y 333 (2002).
263. 85 Cal. App. 4th 468, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (2000).
264. Id. at 475, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210; see supra note 105.
265. Foothills Townhome Ass'n v. Christiansen, 65 Cal. App. 4th 688, 695-96, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516,
520 (1998).
266. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
267. U.S. CONST. amend. I "[T]o petition the government for redress of grievances." (emphasis added).
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Voluntary dismissal. When a SLAPP plaintiff voluntarily dismisses its
complaint before adjudication, what determination must a court make before
awarding fees and costs to the defendant? As noted there is a conflict in the
courts of appeal - in Liu v. Moore26 the court required the merits of the dismissed
action to be decided; 60 but in the earlier case of Coltrain v. Shewalter2 70 the court
held an independent determination on "which party realized its objectives in thelitiatin" wuldbe .... 271
litigation" would be sufficient. Coltrain seems a more sensible solution, as it
does not require adjudication of a moot issue with constitutional implications.
But the Supreme Court should decide whether this approach is permissible.
Shareholders. In deciding whether a controversy about a company was a
"public issue" or "issue of public interest" for anti-SLAPP purposes, several
courts have considered the number of shareholders as a factor favoring272
coverage. But does this factor work the other way? Presumably in a closely
held family corporation the number of shareholders would not be enough to help
with coverage. Where is the dividing line? We know 18,000 shareholders is
enough273-is 1800? Can a quantitative division be anything other than
S• -274
arbitrary?
Actions on released claims. As noted, in Navellier v. Sletten 75 the Supreme
Court held 4-3 that an action on a released claim could qualify for anti-SLAPP
protection. The three justices in dissent argued that as the claim had been
released, petitioning on it was not "valid" and should not be protected. "Sletten
no longer possessed the lawful right to sue Navellier, and thus his nonexistent
right could not be chilled or abridged. 276 The dissent gave the example of Paul
for Council v. Hanyecz, where money laundering, although in aid of an election,
was not considered a "valid" exercise of constitutional rights so as to qualify for
anti-SLAPP protection."' It should not be expected that Navellier has settled this
issue once and for all-the Court may have opened a new debate on the same day
268. 69 Cal. App. 4th 745, 754, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807, 813 (1999).
269. See also Kyle v. Carmon, 71 Cal. App. 4th 901, 918-19, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 314-15 (1999).
270. 66 Cal. App. 4th 94, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600 (1998).
271. Id. at 107, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 608; see supra note 184 and accompanying text.
272. See ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1007-08, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 639
(2001) (millions of shares); Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1265 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(18,000 investors).
273. See Global Telemedia Int'l, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
274. And while on that subject, is there an inconsistency between the position in, for example,
Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1999), that
statements by companies about their competitors are not covered, and those in, for example, ComputerXpress,
Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th at 1007-08, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639 and Global Telemedia International, Inc., 132 F.
Supp. 2d at 1264-65, that if a company is publicly held with lots of shareholders, statements about it concern
public issues? The issue was not mentioned in Globetrotter Software, but should it have mattered for anti-
SLAPP purposes whether Elan was a publicly held corporation? Is a company subject to suit, for example for
trade libel, for what it says about a sole proprietorship but not what it says about a public corporation?
275. 29 Cal. 4th 82, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002).
276. 29 Cal. 4th at 98, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 543 (Brown, J., dissenting).
277. Id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
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it closed another one in Equilon. As the Supreme Court has so recently spoken on
this issue it may be up to the Legislature to address the problem in its 2003-2004
Session.
Section 425.17. The new section, just added, contains many provisions
211whose meaning is not yet certain. Just as the meaning of the statute was
becoming clear on most points, a new and fertile source of dispute has been
created. Supreme Court clarification would be welcome at the earliest possible
moment.
B. Statutory Reform
In recent years there have been a few suggested programs for amending the
anti-SLAPP statute. The original statute required the Judicial Council to report to
the Legislature, by January 1, 1998, on the first five years' experience with the
statute.279 In the event, however, the Judicial Council found data-gathering
difficult, and after the deadline had passed it retained the noted SLAPP scholars
George Pring and Penelope Canan to prepare the report.280 Pring and Canan
prepared a report containing seven recommendations. These were:
(1) Requiring anti-SLAPP movants to file a form for statistical purposes;
(2) Extending the attorney fee provisions "to cover the full costs that
filers have imposed on targets";
(3) Amending the statute to reinforce the judge's discretion regarding the
deadline for filing the motion;
(4) Permitting immediate appeal of denial of an anti-SLAPP motion;
(5) Providing that the anti-SLAPP law does not apply to SLAPP-backs; 28'
278. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
279. "On or before January 1, 1998, the Judicial Council shall report to the Legislature on the frequency
and outcome of special motions made pursuant to this section, and on any other matters pertinent to the
purposes of this section." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(i) (West Supp. 2003). Senate Bill 789, passed but
vetoed in 2002, would have repealed this section as obsolete.
280. One reason it was difficult was that SLAPP suits look on their face like other suits-there is no way
to distinguish them at filing so as to separate out SLAPPs as a universe for further study. For a detailed
examination of the data available to Pring and Canan for their report, and their methods of analysis, see Tate,
supra note 147, at 867-71, a more easily accessible source than the original report. See Penelope Canan &
George W. Pring, Anti-SLAPP Motions: A Report to the Legislature Pursuant to CCP 425.16(2) (sic) Under
Contract to the Administrative Office of the Courts(,) Judicial Council of California (1998), Attachment 2 to
Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts: Legislative Report: Special Motions to
Strike Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation ("SLAPP suits")-Code of Civil Procedure Section
425.16 (May 28, 1999), at 12.
281. A SLAPP-back is an action, in its purest form a cross-action in the original SLAPP suit, seeking
restitution for the injury caused by a SLAPP suit. "The origin of this term is obscure-Pring and Canan trace it
back through phrases in article titles as follows: '. . . SLAPP Defendant Slaps Back' (1988); 'SLAPPs are Back'
(1989); 'Sierra Club SLAPPs Back' (1990); 'SLAPPed ... ? SLAPP back' (1991)." Braun, supra note 8, at 990
n. 101. For full citations, see PRING & CANAN, supra note 6, at 256 n.1.
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(6) Amending the statute to control trial court lifting of the discovery
stay; and
(7) Adding a provision for sanctions against filers and their attorneys.
282
In its report to the Legislature, filed May 28, 1999, the Judicial Council rejected
all seven suggestions. 23 Of these the first-requiring a record of filings for statistical
purposes-was elaborated and enacted anyway, and now forms subsection (k) in the
statute. 84 Likewise their fourth recommendation-that denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion be immediately appealable-was adopted by the Legislature and is now
subsection (j).2 The sixth relates to the need for more certain discovery standards,
already mentioned.211 The other four suggestions have been largely ignored. They are
all good ideas and deserve legislative attention.
Soon after the Judicial Council's report was filed, the present author published
an account of the anti-SLAPP statute containing a different set of nine proposed
reforms, with commentary on each (and on six more not recommended). 287 The
recommended reforms included the following:
(1) Expanding the public interest and issue requirement by including "political
expression" and making other technical changes in sections (a) and (e).
(2) Excepting the government enforcement exemption in subsection (d) from
the recently added provision that the statute be broadly construed.
(3) Allowing for interlocutory appeal of grant or denial of a motion to strike.
As noted, Pring and Canan made a similar suggestion, and this idea has since
been enacted as subsection (j). The proposed reform would also have provided
for entitlement to a stay of proceedings until one level of review had been
completed, and would have allowed the Judicial Council to adopt rules giving
priority to review of SLAPP decisions.
(4) Allowing for sanctions against SLAPP filers and their attorneys. Building
258on a Georgia statute, this provision would have required the attorney and theplaintiff to verify at the time of filing that the action was properly grounded, that
282. This summary of Pring and Canan's recommendations is adapted from Braun, supra note 8, at
1010. The full text of Pring and Canan's recommendations, with the Judicial Council's responses and the
author's extensive comments, is found in Tate, supra note 147, at 871-84.
283. See Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts: Legislative Report: Special
Motions to Strike Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation ("SLAPP suits")--Code of Civil Procedure
Section 425.16 (May 28, 1999), reprinted in Tate, supra note 147, at 871-84.
284. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(k) (West Supp. 2003) (added by Act of Oct. 10, 1999, ch.
960, section 1); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
285. See id. § 425.16(j) (added by Act of Oct. 10, 1999, ch. 960, section 1). "An order granting or
denying a special motion to strike shall be appealable under Section 904.1 ." But if a trial court "denies a special
motion to strike on the grounds that the action or cause of action is exempt pursuant to" newly added
section 425.17, this does not apply. Id. § 425.17(e) (effective Jan. 1,2004).
286. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
287. See Braun, supra note 8, at 1045-57, for the text of the proposed statutory revisions and at 1057-70
for a detailed defense of each proposal.
288. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1(b) (Harrison 1998).
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the acts complained of were not privileged, and that the action was not brought
for an improper purpose. This statement, which echoed the requirements of Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,289 would have forced filers and their
attorneys to confront these issues in advance of filing. As noted, Pring and Canan
made a less ambitious suggestion toward the same end.
(5) Providing for a form notice to accompany every anti-SLAPP motion, and
a register of actions involving these motions to be maintained by county clerks.
The need for this reform has been largely (although not entirely) obviated by the
addition of subsection (k) in 1999. Here too Pring and Canan made a less
comprehensive proposal toward the same end.
(6) Allowing a complaint for malicious prosecution to be brought as a cross-
action, the grant of a motion to strike being considered a favorable conclusion for
this purpose, and creating a rebuttable presumption of lack of probable cause.
The suggested reform as a whole would have allowed the tables to be turned
swiftly on a SLAPP filer, and exposed it to compensatory damages for emotional
distress and constitutional tort as well as punitive damages, without the need for a
separate action for which no attorney fee award would have been available.2 9 The
Supreme Court has recently ruled that defeat of an anti-SLAPP motion, if
decided on the issue of probability of success, can establish probable cause for a
later malicious prosecution action.29'
(7) A strengthened immunity statute, based on that suggested in a model law
proposed by Pring and Canan.29
(8) A new Government Code provision allowing the Attorney General to
intervene and assume the cost of defending a SLAPP suit.
(9) A new Revenue and Taxation Code provision rectifying the anomaly in the
present state tax laws, under which the cost of bringing a SLAPP suit is deductible
as a business expense, while the cost of defending it is not.2 93
As with Pring and Canan's unenacted suggestions, these too still merit the
attention of the Legislature. Suggestions four (pre-filing verification), six
289. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
290. This proposal has a useful synergy with the sixth of Pring and Canan's proposals, to declare that the
anti-SLAPP law does not apply to SLAPP-backs. At the moment an action against a SLAPP filer could itself
encounter a motion to strike, based on the idea that the SLAPP filer was exercising his right to petition. The
counter-argument is that the SLAPP filer's action was a sham. Compare California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 92 S.Ct. 609 (1972), where concerted activity to block competitors'
regulatory applications was held a "sham" and thus subject to antitrust remedies even though it was "nominally"
constitutionally protected petitioning activity, with City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499
U.S. 365, Ill S.Ct. 1344 (1991) (genuine attempt to influence government action, distinguishing California
Motor Transport). For a California SLAPP case approaching the same result in a different context, see Paul for
Council v. Hanyecz, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1360-63, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 866-68 (2001) (laundering of
campaign contributions not a "valid" exercise of constitutional rights subject to anti-SLAPP protection).
291. See Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th 811, 820, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 26 (2002).
292. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 6, at 203.
293. It was intended that the state tax reform be a model for a parallel federal tax reform. See Braun,
supra note 8, at 1070.
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(malicious prosecution cross-action) and nine (correction of tax inequity) would
probably have the most markedly beneficial effects in preventing the abuse of
SLAPP filing.
On February 21, 2002, Senator Sheila Kuehl (D., Los Angeles) who had
sponsored the 1999 amendment to the statute, introduced SB 1651 in the
Legislature.294 Originally the bill did nothing more than abolish the obsolete
subsection (i), requiring the 1998 report. 295 But two public interest organizations, the
California Anti-SLAPP Project and Consumer Attorneys of California, urged
Senator Kuehl to amend her bill to include several new provisions, which she did on
May 7, 2002.2%
The first of these provisions would have expanded the government enforcement
exemption to exempt also (a) actions "brought [solely] in the public interest or on
behalf of the general public," and (b) actions against sellers or lessors of goods or
services, provided certain conditions existed. 297 Another new provision would have
exempted from this carveout "any person enumerated" in two long lists: the state
constitutional freedom of the press provision, and the "newsmen's privilege" section
of the Evidence Code.298
During legislative maneuvering late in the session the provisions of SB 1651
became incorporated into SB 789.29 It was passed on August 31, 2002 but vetoed
on September 30.'w On February 20, 2003 Senator Kuehl introduced a new bill,
SB 515, which passed and was signed into law on September 6, enacting the
301principal provisions of the former bills. It also made the general stay and appeal
294. SB 1651 (2002) (as introduced on Feb. 21, 2002, but not enacted).
295. See id.
296. Id. (as amended on May 7, 2002, but not enacted).
297. Id. § I (Cal. 2002).
298. Id.
299. Compare SB 789 (2001) (as amended Aug. 15, 2002, but not enacted), with SB 1651 (2002) (as
amended May 7, 2002, but not enacted).
300. In his veto message Governor Davis said the bill "was a product of a late in the session 'gut and
amend' and I am not satisfied that it strikes the right balance." He added that he "would be willing to consider
legislation that provides for expedited review of an appeal granting an anti-SLAPP motion." Governor's Veto
Message, supra note 218.
301. The 2002 bill contained some other provisions not found in the bill which passed into law in 2003.
It would, for example, have enacted a legislative note, to read:
In enacting the amendments to this section made by Senate Bill 1651 of the 2001-02 Regular
Session, it is the intent of the Legislature to respond in disapproval to the holding of DuPont Merck
Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, in that a drug manufacturer invoked the
use of this section to defend against a class action suit that alleged a violation of the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act (Title 1.5 (commencing with Section 1750) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil
Code) and Section 17500 of the Business and Professions Code, including allegations of the
publishing and dissemination of false and misleading information to regulatory bodies, the medical
profession, and the public.
It is further the intent of the Legislature that the applicability of this section does not restrict the
ability of the news media to comment on matters of public significance and gather and disseminate
information as news to the public, and is not limited to the news media. It is further the intent of the
Legislature that this act does not apply to the dissemination of ideas or expression in any book or
academic journal.
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provisions, which apply to a denied motion, inapplicable when it is denied on this
basis.3' 2 The principal purpose of these provisions is to carve out an exception for
commercial speech. The problem as perceived in the Legislature was that when
large companies are sued for their commercial speech (or on other grounds such
as products liability) they sometimes respond with an anti-SLAPP motion, which
can be effective tactically even if it ultimately fails. 03 The new legislation
withholds the anti-SLAPP maneuver from companies exercising commercial
speech while retaining it for a long list of people and entities exercising
S.B. 1651, § I (Cal. 2002).
302. As amended on May 1, 2003, SB 515 moved the new exemption provisions proposed for section
425.16 to a new section 425.17. This new section had its own preamble, section 425.17(a), reading
The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing abuse of Section 425.16,
the California Anti-SLAPP Law, which has undermined the exercise of the constitutional
rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances, contrary to the purpose
and intent of Section 425.16. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest
to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this
participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process or Section 425.16.
SB 515 (2003) (as amended May 1, 2003) (approved by Governor Gray Davis Sept. 6, 2003, filed with
Secretary of State Sept. 8, 2003).
303. According to the sponsor, Consumer Attorneys of California (CAOC), this bill is needed to stop
corporate abuse of the anti-SLAPP statute and return to its original purpose of protecting citizens'
rights of petition and free speech. CAOC asserts that in recent years a growing number of large
corporations have inappropriately invoked the anti-SLAPP statute to delay and discourage
consumer and other litigation against them by filing meritless anti-SLAPP motions. ... CAOC also
cites a number of recent published opinions where corporate defendants brought anti-SLAPP
motions. Although each of these motions was unsuccessful, CAOC contends that they delayed the
litigation because of the automatic discovery stay and interlocutory appeal provisions of the anti-
SLAPP statute. [ ] Proponents contend that the increased use of meritless anti-SLAPP motions by
corporate defendants subverts the purpose of the anti-SLAPP law. CAOC argues that the anti-
SLAPP statute was created in direct response to legislative concern about the filing of lawsuits
primarily to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights, and that the anti-SLAPP protections
were intended to protect citizens from expensive retaliatory lawsuits that are brought to chill their
valid exercise of their free speech and petition rights. Proponents argue that this chilling effect does
not apply when a large corporate defendant has massive resources that they may rely upon in
litigation, unlike the private citizen.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 515, at 2-3 (July 8, 2003), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/bill/sen/sb_0501-0550/sb 515_cfa_20030709_163817_asmfloor.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2003) (copy on
file with the McGeorge Law Review). A much fuller set of legislative history materials may be found by
entering the bill number at www.leginfo.ca.gov.
The Analyst's Report continues:
This bill does exclude certain types of actions from the anti-SLAPP special motion to strike
procedure. While it may be asserted that this distinction disadvantages the excluded speech, it
should be remembered that the anti-SLAPP motion is designed to advance the significant
governmental interest in protecting the exercise of free speech and petition rights by citizens
and community groups who are subject to SLAPP suits. In other words, even if this bill
excludes some commercial speech from the anti-SLAPP motion, there is a countervailing
governmental interest in protecting the non-commercial speech of individual citizen and
small community that is targeted by SLAPP suits. It is also important to keep in mind that this
bill does not attach liability to any speech, nor does it override existing law, which may
provide a defense against liability based on the nature of the speech. Moreover, it is also true
that a party who believes that legal claims have been asserted against them because of the
exercise of constitutional rights may still assert a demurrer or other dispositive motion, even
if the special anti-SLAPP procedure is not available.
Id. at 3.
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traditional First Amendment speech. As adopted, it may have the effect of
deliberately unbalancing a statute which up until now has operated more or less
the same way for everyone. 3°4 The exemptions may cause as many problems as
they solve, and will be a fruitful source of litigation for some time to come.305
V. CONCLUSION
Although there remains ample scope for the Legislature to improve
California's anti-SLAPP remedy, eleven years after its passage it appears to be
well established and working more or less as it was intended to do. And while
difficult issues remain, and will no doubt continue to arise as they do with every
statutory scheme of any complexity, it seems fair to say that the early period of
uncertainty is now over, and (with the obvious exception of the new statutory
exemptions just added) there is now an ample body of precedent sufficient to
guide bar, bench and litigants in most areas of practice under the statute.
304. An earlier Legislative Analyst's Report (on June 30, 2003) characterized the opposition position as
follows:
Opponents argue that the bill impermissibly affects commercial speech, and will subject
businesses to harassing SLAPP suits intended solely to attack their exercise of constitutional
free speech and petition rights. As a result, opponents contend, businesses will be subject to
many meritless lawsuits and will be coerced into settling or incurring unnecessary litigation
costs simply for exercising their constitutional rights.
ASSEMBLY COMMITFEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 515, at 2 (July 1, 2003), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0501-0550/sb_515_cfa 20030630_121334_asm_comm.html (last
visited Oct. 17, 2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
305. It also moves back toward a view of the statute that conditions its application on the original
paradigm of protecting small activists from large corporations. This view has been rejected by the courts, based
on the scrupulously even-handed language of the statute before the most recent revision. See, e.g., cases cited
supra note 29 and accompanying text.

